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1. See Nate Anderson, Universal: You don’t own those promotional CDs we
gave you, ARS TECHNICA (Apr. 9, 2008, 10:15 PM), http://arstechnica.com/
tech-policy/news/2008/04/universal-tossing-that-promo-cd-violates-ourrights.ars
(Fred Von Lohmann, copyright attorney, formerly at EFF, stated, “CDs, books,
DVDs, and video games could be festooned with ‘notices’ that erode a customer’s
first sale, fair use, and other rights.”) (emphasis added) (last visited Jan. 21,
2011).
2. See ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, http://www.eff.org (last visited
Dec. 13, 2011).
3. Corynne McSherry, “Magic Words” Trump User Rights: Ninth Circuit
Ruling in Vernor v. Autodesk, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION,
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Imagine a book, a DVD, a CD or a video game packaged
with a notice stating that the user had the perpetual right to
enjoy this book, this film, this music album or this game for
their personal use only. Is such a notice legally binding?1 If
the user ignored that notice and sold the item on eBay, would
there be repercussions? Although the answer to that specific
question is not known yet, the operative word in the
preceding clause is “yet.” For, if the “personal use” notice was
couched as an “agreement,”—more commonly known in the
digital commercial world as an “end user license
agreement,”—and if it contained a few more phrases than
“personal use only,”—such as clauses specifying restrictions
on title—there is now circuit court authority suggesting that
publishers, music producers and other content producers
effectively may control the secondary markets for commercial
distribution.
Anticipating this possibly cataclysmic outcome, the
Electronic Frontier Foundation (“EFF”),2 a digital rights
advocacy group, recently warned that a “dangerous decision”
would permit copyright owners to use “a few ‘magic words’ in
a license agreement” to deprive consumers of their traditional
rights to sell, borrow or donate copyrighted materials.3 This
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(Sept. 13, 2010), http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2010/09/magic-words-trump-userrights-ninth-circuit-ruling.
4. Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc. (Vernor II), 621 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2010).
5. See id. at 1111, 1116.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. See infra notes 103–08 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 103–05 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 73–96 and accompanying text.
11. See Vernor II, 621 F.3d at 1115. Cf. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Augusto,
628 F.3d 1175 (9th Cir. 2011).
12. See Brian W. Carver, Why License Agreements Do Not Control Copy
Ownership: First Sales and Essential Copies, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1887,
1890 (2010) (Carver notes that there is a “larger debate concerning whether
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dangerous decision was the Ninth Circuit’s opinion, Vernor v.
Autodesk,4 issued on September 10, 2010, which determined
that Timothy Vernor infringed Autodesk’s software copyright
when he attempted to sell a copy of Autodesk software on
eBay.5 Vernor had purchased an authentic copy of the
software from a company who, in turn, had purchased it
directly from Autodesk.6 The license agreement attached to
the software, however, restricted its use to the initial
purchaser and prohibited further transfer without Autodesk’s
express permission.7
Prior to Vernor v. Autodesk, Ninth Circuit district courts
were split on the question of the application of copyright law’s
first sale doctrine in the context of software licensing
transactions.8 All three district court decisions involved the
same software producer, Adobe, with two decisions favoring
Adobe and one against it.9 If one includes software decisions
on the related copyright doctrines of fair use and essential
copying, the upshot is that decisions adjudicating licensing
disputes have lined up decisively in favor of the software
producers.10 The implications here are important because
while the commercial practice and the court decisions have
been confined to software, even the Ninth Circuit
acknowledged the broad application of the principles stated in
its decision, Vernor v. Autodesk, to digital media generally,
including DVDs and CDs.11
These trends have not been lost on scholars.
Commentators have argued for some time that overreaching
software producers have attempted to “contract around” and
otherwise eliminate statutory privileges, including first sale
that a copyright user should enjoy.12 In general the courts
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have not been persuaded by the commentary, as the courts
found these end user license agreements (also called shrink
wrap, mass market, referred to herein as EULA or EULAs)
enforceable and not preempted by federal copyright law.13
Thus, the weight of opinion among scholars has been critical
of pro-software decisions whereas the weight of decisions
culminating with the recent Ninth Circuit decision has
favored the software producer.14
Why are the courts so unpersuaded by this commentary?
Scholars have been distracted by the contract critique and
have failed to expose the underlying theoretical dialectic in
copyright. This Article attempts to reframe the debate by
focusing the discussion on the underlying copyright theories
competing in the conflicting decisions. One aim of this
discussion is to provide greater coherency to the underlying
rationales of the decisions. The normative objective is to
propose adjustments to the first sale doctrine of copyright to
ameliorate the potential negative effects of the current trend.
The pro-software producer decisions are best justified as
a product of the “property rights” paradigm of copyright,
grounded in natural rights and economic theory.
The
“property rights” paradigm supports a very narrow
construction of the first sale doctrine or in Professor
Goldstein’s characterization of the “copyright optimists,”
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mass consumer contracts should trump the policies embodied in statutory
schemes enacted by Congress . . . . [B]oilerplate [end-user license agreements]
that purport to restrict rights [that users of copyrighted works] have grown
accustomed to . . . and [that] Congress intended they have as part of its larger
effort to craft a balanced Copyright Act.”); Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property
and Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1239, 1239 (1995) (Lemley claimed
that “[s]oftware vendors are attempting en masse to ‘opt out’ of intellectual
property law by drafting license provisions that compel their customers to
adhere to more restrictive provisions than copyright (and even patent) law
would require.”); David A. Rice, Licensing the Use of Computer Program Copies
and the Copyright Act First Sale Doctrine, 30 JURIMETRICS J. 157, 185–86
(1990) (“The antitrust issue, then may reduce to whether it is reasonable to
leverage copyright by contract to establish suprastatutory liability . . . . [T]he
answer seems clear that what is involved is the contractual expansion of a
limited statutory monopoly.”).
13. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996); Nat’l Car
Rental Sys., Inc. v. Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc., 991 F.2d 426 (8th Cir. 1993);
Taquino v. Teledyne Monarch Rubber, 893 F.2d 1488 (5th Cir. 1990); Acorn
Structures, Inc. v. Swantz, 846 F.2d 923 (4th Cir. 1988).
14. See infra notes 73–96 and accompanying text.

31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 12 Side A

04/16/2012 17:10:32

SHERIDAN FINAL

2012]

3/29/2012 2:22:16 PM

RISE OF PROPERTY RIGHTS THEORY

301

04/16/2012 17:10:32

15. See infra notes 27–31 and accompanying text. Professor Goldstein
introduced the “celestial jukebox,” a metaphor for the ideal “property rights”
model of digital dissemination of content. In this model, consumers can
purchase content but have no ability to transfer that content to third parties.
16. See infra Part I.B.6.
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perhaps no first sale doctrine at all.15 On the other side, the
decisions against the software producer found limits on the
ability of the copyright holder to control the distribution of its
creative works. In this context, “limits” means the ability (or
restraint on the ability) of the copyright holder to retain title
to its copyrighted work (e.g., DVD or CD) after placing it in
the stream of commerce.
The “traditional incentives” school of thought advocates
greater access to these creative works and a broad
construction of the first sale doctrine.16 Adherents of this
school of thought argue that if the consumer has indefinite
possession of the DVD, or other cultural product, and has
paid full price (no other payments are due) then this should
be characterized as a sale for purposes of copyright’s first sale
doctrine. If the court upheld the user’s right to transfer the
cultural product (e.g., DVD) then it is placing “limits” on the
copyright holder’s (content producers) ability to control
distribution of its copyrighted products. The current majority
rule, as expressed in the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Vernor v.
Autodesk, runs contrary to this view and supports the ability
of the copyright holder to unilaterally dictate the terms of
downstream distribution of its copyrighted works.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I introduces the
analytical framework to illustrate the dialectic tension
between the “traditional incentives” strand of utilitarian
theory of copyright and the “property rights” paradigm, the
product of another strand of utilitarian theory with natural
rights philosophy.
These competing approaches to the
justification of copyright inform and influence the divergent
outcomes of the software decisions. This section provides the
context for the main argument that the rise of the “property
rights” rationale in the judicial doctrine, both implied and
expressed, is displacing the “traditional incentives” rationale,
as seen in the recent pro-software producer decisions. Where
the “traditional incentives” justification for copyright law
addresses the balance between the protection afforded to the
copyright holder and the public’s access to copyrighted works,
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the “property rights” rationale focuses on the benefit to
societal welfare derived from maximal control of the works by
the copyright holder.
The second section of Part I provides further contextual
background to the contemporary software first sale decisions
that influenced the courts and commentators. The early
judicial and legislative treatment of software contributed to
the misplaced emphasis by the courts on flawed contract
reasoning and weak statutory construction, rather than a
coherent copyright analysis. These areas included: (a) the ongoing debate throughout the 1990s of the efforts of the
software industry to create a special statutory scheme in the
UCC to establish default rules for software transactions
consistent with their interests, including non-alienability of
software products; (b) the problem of borrowing from the
statutory construction of § 117 on essential copying of
software to inform the construction of the term “owner” in §
109’s first sale doctrine; (c) early software decisions that
established a pattern of turning to the UCC to interpret
EULAs and potential conflicts with copyright; and (d)
academic commentary’s misplaced emphasis on the UCC and
contract preemption.
Part II argues that the pro-software decisions are more
justifiably explained by tracing their heritage to several
earlier decisions involving not only software but also other
content, film prints and children’s toys. These pre-digital
“heritage” decisions represent an important link to the later
rise of the “property rights” paradigm of copyright. These
decisions evidence an “inherent rights” doctrine of copyright
ownership derived from natural rights theory of copyright.
The “inherent rights” doctrine of these heritage decisions
informs the natural rights branch of the “property rights”
paradigm; the other branch being the utilitarian strand of
economic theory inspired by the work of Professor Harold
Demsetz. By tracing the influence of “inherent rights”
doctrine of the heritage decisions on the current “property
rights” model, the underlying copyright rationale at work in
these contemporary pro-software decisions becomes visible.
The “property rights” model provides a more coherent
rationale for these contemporary pro-software outcomes,
rather than the flawed contract analysis and weak statutory
construction expressed in the opinions.
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17. Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Strauss, 210 U.S. 339 (1908).
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Part III analyzes the line of decisions finding against the
software producer in the context of the original principles of
the first sale doctrine as enunciated by the Supreme Court in
its decision, Bobbs-Merrill v. Straus.17 The rationale of these
decisions, both express and implied, supports the “traditional
incentives” model of drawing a limit on the power of the
copyright holder to retain title to copyrighted works after
they have been placed in the stream of commerce. These
limits are intended to ensure the benefits of availability and
accessibility of creative works to the society at large. The
limits are invoked by courts when they resist the
characterization by copyright holders of its distribution as
something other than a sale when the principles of rightful
possession have been met, namely indefinite possession and
full price. At the moment, however, this is the minority view
of the courts, and arguably has been overruled by precedent
of Ninth Circuit in its recent decision in Vernor v. Autodesk.
Finally the Article proposes a model of “constructive
ownership,” drawn from the “rightful possessor” theory of
ownership as articulated by the minority view, which includes
the Bobbs-Merrill principles of “full dominion” and
“satisfactory price.”
However, the model adds a third
dependent prong for the special case of software. A central
tenet of this Article is that judicial doctrine has evolved to
accommodate software and in the process it has distorted the
important principles of Bobbs-Merrill with respect to the first
sale doctrine. This model allows for the special case of
software if certain conditions are met, namely a continuing
license of intellectual property. This model, if adopted by the
courts, would limit the Ninth Circuit decision in Vernor v.
Autodesk to software (assuming it met the conditions of the
model) but not apply the decision to other digital media. The
theory and rationale of the “traditional incentives” model
forms the best fit with the progenitor first sale decision,
Bobbs-Merrill, and fulfills those promises made over a
century ago.
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A. Analytical Framework of Competing Copyright Theories
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18. See infra Part I.B.6.
19. Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Inspiration and Innovation: The Intrinsic
Dimension of the Artistic Soul, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1945, 1980 (2006)
(“Utilitarianism is the predominant copyright justification in the United States,
as evidenced by the Copyright Clause’s affording protection for a limited time as
an economic incentive to create.”).
20. Peter S. Menell, Intellectual Property: General Theories, in 2
ENCYLOPEDIA OF LAW & ECONOMICS, 129, 130 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit
de Geist eds., 2000); cf. Jane C. Ginsburg, A Tale of Two Copyrights: Literary
Property in Revolutionary France and America, 64 TUL. L. REV. 991, 1023
(1990). Professor Ginsburg argues against the conventional conception of a neat
divide between the origins of the two systems, namely a utilitarian conception
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As argued in this Article, the unifying theme that lends
coherence to the pro-software (content) producer decisions on
the one hand and the decisions finding against the software
(content) producer on the other hand, lies in an analysis and
understanding of the divergent theoretical views for the
justification of copyright law. The scholarly debate and the
dominant critique of the pro-software decisions focuses on the
courts’ express reasoning for its outcomes, which have been
based on contract analysis and statutory construction.18 The
implied reasoning of the pro-software decisions and the
express reasoning of the pre-digital “heritage” first sale
decisions favoring content producers are both derivative of
the “property rights” paradigm of copyright. The recent
decisions finding against the software producer on first sale
reveal some express reasoning which relies on the “traditional
incentives” model of copyright; however their persuasive
authority is diluted, it is argued, by a similar distraction of
flawed contract reasoning and misplaced statutory
construction.
The “property rights” paradigm and the
“traditional incentives” model of copyright are explained
below.
The U.S. intellectual property regime has traditionally
been viewed as justified by a utilitarian view that granting
copyright and patent protection for works and inventions
promotes social welfare.19 As Peter Menell claimed in his
article, Intellectual Property: General Theories, “[t]he
utilitarian framework has been particularly central to the
development of copyright law in the United States.”20
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The consensus breaks down at the definition of social
welfare and the precise mechanism, i.e., amount and type of
protection, to achieve that optimal social welfare.21 A major
strand of utilitarian theory, arguably the dominant one in
academic circles, posits that the level of protection can
increase too far causing deadweight losses from monopoly
exploitation.22 Scholarship following this view has referred to
the “delicate balance” embodied in copyright law and policy
between protecting the rights of the content producers on the
one hand, and ensuring the access and availability of the
creative works to the public both for improver rights and

31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 14 Side A
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for the U.S., and natural rights basis for France. Id. at 994–95. Rather the
systems were influenced by both bases of copyright justification. Id. at 1000,
1012–13. In her conclusion, she noted that “the characteristic modern portrayal
of French revolutionary copyright as an unambiguous espousal of an authorcentric view of copyright requires substantial amendment,” and that “familiar
conceptions of early U.S. copyright also warrant reconsideration.” Id. at 1023.
If U.S. copyright’s exponents sought to promote the progress of knowledge, they
also recognized that the author’s labors are due their own reward.” Id.
Professor Paul Goldstein similarly argued that natural rights theory has
influenced copyright in the U.S. (and England) but he would call it “practical
intuition and economic analysis” that have produced the “same prescription that
natural rights theory has produced on the Continent.” PAUL GOLDSTEIN,
COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL JUKEBOX 178–79
(1994). In his classic work on copyright, Professor Benjamin Kaplan’s intimated
that the influence of the “natural rights” theory was at work in Judge Learned
Hand’s decision in Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Picture Corp., where the plaintiff
argued that its play had been infringed by the film producer defendant.
BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 2 (1966). In his
criticism of the decision, Kaplan stated, “I reflected that if man has any ‘natural’
rights, not the least must be a right to imitate his fellows, and thus reap where
he has not sown. Education after all proceeds from a kind of mimicry, and
‘progress,’ if it is not entirely an illusion, depends on generous indulgence of
copying.” Id. In his study of the origins of Britain’s Statute of Anne, the first
copyright statute, and the model for the first U.S. copyright statute, Professor
Mark Rose noted that the Statute of Anne curtailed the efforts of the London
booksellers to transform their prior licensing privilege into a perpetual common
law right of copyright. MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS: THE INVENTION OF
COPYRIGHT, 47–48 (Harvard Univ. Press 1993). It did not, as he noted, “settle
the theoretical questions behind the notion of literary property.” Id.
21. See William Fisher, Theories of Intellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN
THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 1, 14 (Stephen R. Munzer, ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 2001).
22. See id. at 14–15 (Professor William Nordhaus applied classic monopoly
economic theory to intellectual property to demonstrate that the monopoly
model will price higher and produce less than in a free competition model; thus
leading to the creation of a consumer surplus or “deadweight loss” of output
unavailable to society.); Menell, supra note 20, at 133; William A. Landes &
Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD.
325 (1989) [hereinafter An Economic Analysis].
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general dissemination of knowledge on the other.23 This
balance has often been referred to as the “protection-access”
paradigm.24
In a different direction of scholarship, it has been argued
that under a “property rights” theory more protection is
justified to respond to the needs and wants of consumers in
the marketplace and to encourage investment in the
continuing availability of creative works. Professor Fisher
cited the work of 1960’s Chicago school economist, Harold
Demsetz, for inspiring this school of thought which argued for
strong property rights in intellectual property and relied on
Coasean theory of bargaining as the most efficient method of
allocating and distributing the fruits of the intellectual
property regime in society.25 A basic assumption of this

31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 14 Side B
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23. Fisher, supra note 21, at 2; An Economic Analysis, supra note 22, at 326.
24. See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Reexamining Copyright’s Incentives-Access
Paradigm, 49 VAND. L. REV., 483, 492 (1996). Within the “balance” group there
have been variations depending on value norms around definition of societal
value, and level of concern about the access side of the paradigm. The economic
theory model as espoused by Landes & Posner has been associated with a
“strong rights” model because they have argued for “indefinite copyright.” See
Neil W. Netanel, Why Has Copyright Expanded? Analysis and Critique, in 6
NEW DIRECTIONS IN COPYRIGHT LAW 3, 20 (Fiona Macmillan ed., Edward Elgar
Publ’g 2007). In discussing these variations in his article, Theories of
Intellectual Property, William Fisher, included Landes & Posner squarely in the
incentives theory approach of intellectual property. See Fisher, supra note 21,
at 4. Landes & Posner did not advocate absolute property rights for copyright
holders. Their “indefinite copyright” would consist of renewable short terms
that they believed would have the effect of a) promoting greater investment in
protected works and b) enlarging the public domain. See William M. Landes &
Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 471,
517–18 (2003) [hereinafter Indefinitely Renewable Copyright]. More important
to this discussion, they acknowledged that a balance must be struck between
incentives and access to creative works, and have stated that “[s]triking the
correct balance between access and incentives is the central problem in
copyright law.” See An Economic Analysis, supra note 22, at 326. In their
analysis of maximal societal welfare they have argued for a broad construal of
fair use and a narrow construal of “substantial similarity” standard for
copyright infringement. See Robin Elizabeth Herr, Is the Sui Generis Right a
Failed Experiment? 66 (DJØF Publ’g 2008). Another viewpoint on the question
of “balance,” there are those scholars that William Fisher grouped (including
himself) who fall in the category of social and institutional planning. See
Fisher, supra note 21, at 6–8. A distinctive feature of this group particularly in
comparison to Landes & Posner is the belief that societal welfare should be
defined broader than in purely economic terms, e.g. creative expression, civic
participation. The unifying theme of both viewpoints is that they acknowledge
and support some limits on the copyright holder’s power and control over its
creative works for the benefit of the societal welfare.
25. See Fisher, supra note 21, at 15; Menell, supra note 20, at 133.
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theory was that the copyright holder is best situated to
Another
control the allocation of its creative works.26
distinctive feature of this model is the mechanism of price
discrimination as a critical tool for the copyright holder (asset
owner) to maximize the efficient allocation of its creative
works. For example, a software producer may choose to
discriminate in pricing its product, depending on the type of
user (e.g., a non-commercial “home” user pays a lower price
than a commercial “business” user). The theory holds that
this mechanism maximizes both optimal use of the product in
society and profit to the asset owner.
To illustrate Demsetz’s influence on legal theory,
Professor Fisher quoted from Paul Goldstein’s invocation in
his treatise, Copyright’s Highway: From Gutenberg to the
Celestial Jukebox:
The logic of property rights dictates their extension into
every corner in which people derive enjoyment and value
from literary and artistic works. To stop short of these
ends would deprive producers of the signals of consumer
preference that trigger and direct their investments.27

04/16/2012 17:10:32

26. See Netanel, supra note 24, at 18.
27. Fisher, supra note 21, at 15 (emphasis added); GOLDSTEIN, supra note
20, at 178–79 .
28. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 20, at 15.
29. Id. at 17.
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Although Professor Goldstein did not openly claim to be a
“property rights” theorist who has abandoned or discredited
the incentives theory camp, his sentiments seemed pretty
clearly aligned with those he referred to as “copyright
optimists.” In the first chapter of his book entitled, The
Metaphysics of Copyright, Professor Goldstein described
“copyright optimists” as those “who assert . . . natural justice,
entitling authors to every last penny that other people will
pay to obtain copies of their works . . . . [T]hey view
copyright’s cup of entitlement as always half full, only
waiting to be filled still further.”28 A few pages later he
succinctly noted that the “copyright optimists” rely on the
“larger truth” of “natural rights” to support their view of the
extension of copyright into every corner.29 Later in the book
where Professor Demsetz’s work on property rights approach
to intellectual property was introduced, Professor Goldstein
concluded that such a view was consistent with not only “the
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same prescription that natural rights theory has produced on
the Continent” but also with “two hundred years of practical
intuition and economic analysis in England and the United
States.”30 If there was any doubt regarding his sentiments
they were dispelled by the penultimate sentence of his
treatise:
The main challenge will be to keep this trajectory clear of
the buffets of protectionism and true to copyright’s historic
logic that the best prescription for connecting authors to
their audiences is to extend rights into every corner where
consumers derive value from literary and artistic works.31

04/16/2012 17:10:32

30. Id. at 179.
31. Id. at 236.
32. See Netanel, supra note 24, at 18.
33. Cf. Netanel, supra note 24, at 24 (discusses the influences on the
“copyright as a natural right” rationale, including the 18th and 19th century
Romantic ideal of the author as unique, a genius, “eschewing any imitation or
reliance upon the work of others.”).
34. See Netanel, supra note 24, at 18. Professor Netanel provided a lucid
discussion of the “copyright is property” rationale and its view that copyright “is
primarily a mechanism for facilitating markets in existing expression” and can
best serve that goal “when copyright owners have full proprietary control over
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The absence of any discussion of monopoly inefficiencies
leads the reader to the conclusion that Professor Goldstein
(again for himself or on behalf of the “copyright optimists”)
rejected the incentive theory’s assumptions. Consistent with
the property rights approach, he adhered to the belief that,
similar to the assumptions in real property, the property
owner (landowner or copyright holder) knows best how to
allocate uses of property.32 There was also an implicit
assumption in the “copyright optimists” argument that the
boundaries of this property were clear and little concern
about reliance of copyright systems on creations of others.33
Professor Goldstein’s central metaphor of his treatise, the
celestial jukebox, proves all allocation to society is solved by
the technological wonders of the digital dissemination model.
The “celestial jukebox” celebrated in Professor Goldstein’s
treatise embraced the economic theory underlying the
“property rights” paradigm, namely that price discrimination
by the property owner will result in the optimal creation and
allocation of the creative works. The common denominator of
the “property rights” group is the combination of the property
motif and the markets mechanism.34 Similar to real property
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(arguably more than chattel), the concept of control over the
property is vested in the landowner or copyright holder as the
one best situated to make the determination regarding
allocation and use of its resource.35 In addition the “property
rights” paradigm, as illustrated by Professor Goldstein, also
draws on natural rights philosophy for further justification of
the maximal control of the asset by the copyright owner.
In his article, Why Has Copyright Expanded?, Professor
Netanel remarked that the influence of the “copyright is
private property” group had increased with the support of the
copyright industry.36 He traced their philosophical heritage
to 18th century William Blackstone who argued for
“perpetual
exclusive
rights”
for
author’s
literary
37
Professor Netanel claimed that this view
compositions.
conflicted with the main thrust of U.S. jurisprudence, citing
many Supreme Court references to copyright as a “statutory
monopoly” or “limited monopoly privilege.”38
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their works.”
Id.
As he explained, concentrating control of exclusive
proprietary rights in a single owner facilitates the licensing and marketing
strategies for the original work and any derivative works. Id.
35. See Netanel, supra note 24, at 18. Professor Netanel lumped the work of
Landes & Posner with the “copyright is property” group; however, I argue, like
Professor Fisher, that Landes & Posner’s viewpoint may exist on the
conservative side of the “delicate balance” spectrum but they do subscribe to
that view rather than the “property rights” view as discussed supra.
36. See Netanel, supra note 24, at 12.
37. See Netanel, supra note 24, at 21–22. Professor Netanel discusses the
“copyright as property” viewpoint separately from the “copyright as a natural
right.” Id. at 18, 21. William Blackstone was an early advocate of natural
rights jurisprudence. It is worth noting that Blackstone developed his natural
rights approach to copyright as a private attorney on behalf of his clients,
private London booksellers. Blackstone’s clients were attempting to establish a
permanent common law right in literary property in the mid-18th century
England in reaction to the passage of the Statute of Anne. See ROSE, supra note
20, at 75, 77–78, 88–89. I analyze the “copyright as property” viewpoint as
relying on “natural rights” theory for further support to its economic theory
argument. This view is also supported by Professor Goldstein’s treatise,
Copyright Highway, which clearly combined a natural rights justification with a
markets based, property rights theory in its holistic philosophy and approach to
copyright law as expressed by Goldstein’s concept of the “copyright optimist”
discussed supra.
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 20; supra notes 27–31 and
accompanying text. Goldstein does not directly cite William Blackstone
although he does refer to the “practical intuition and economic analysis” of the
past two hundred years in U.S. and England that has produced same
prescription as natural rights theory on the Continent. GOLDSTEIN, supra note
20, at 178–79.
38. See Netanel, supra note 24, at 12. Professor Netanel cited the Supreme
Court in Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 526 (1994) as stating that
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Professor Netanel also noted that the receptiveness of
lower courts and the legislature to the absolute proprietary
model of intellectual property (including copyright) has been
on the rise.39 He cited Judge Frank Easterbrook, author of
the landmark ProCD v. Zeidenberg40 opinion, discussed infra,
as a strong advocate for the property rights/market approach
to intellectual property. Judge Easterbrook wrote in his
article Intellectual Property is Still Property that “except in
the rarest case we should treat IP and physical property
identically in the law,” supporting narrow exceptions to
copyright.41 The ProCD opinion openly advocated the price
discrimination model, consistent with the “property rights”
paradigm, as a method of and justification for the property
rights model.42 When Professor Goldstein published his
initial treatise, Copyright’s Highway in 1994, he had written
that “with few exceptions—most notably opinions written by
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, decades ago—the Court’s
attitude has been to treat copyright’s cup as half empty, not
half full.”43 Professor Goldstein believed that the Supreme
Court had drawn an imaginary line around the public’s home
space immunizing the activity in the home from copyright
infringement.44
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“copyrights are monopoly privileges that . . . while ‘intended to motivate . . .
create activity . . . by provision of a special reward,’ are limited in nature and
must ultimately serve the public good.”); cf. see Netanel, supra note 24, at 18.
Netanel cited work by Professor Merges that has criticized “incentive theory as
‘crude’ and ‘two-dimensional.’ ” Id. at 18 n.49.
39. See Netanel, supra note 24, at 13.
40. ProCD v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996); see infra notes 80–84
and accompanying text. Netanel, supra note 24, at 13.
41. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Intellectual Property is Still Property, 13
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 108, 118 (1990).
42. See ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1449–50.
43. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 20, at 33.
44. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 20, at 202. Goldstein’s work, Copyright’s
Highway, was first published in 1994 following Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal
City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) but before MGM Studios, Inc. v.
Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005). Sony held that private copying of television
broadcasts by means of videotaping did not constitute infringement and was
protected by fair use. Sony, 464 U.S. at 423–24. In Grokster, the Court found
that private peer to peer file sharing of copyrighted music did constitute
copyright infringement based on an inducement theory of contributory
infringement. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 929–30. Unlike Sony, neither the
individuals nor the technology companies facilitating the “sharing” were
immunized by fair use. Id.
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A great deal had changed between the first publication of
Copyright’s Highway in 1994, and Professor Netanel’s article
written in 2007. The DMCA was passed in 1998, granting
sweeping powers to copyright holders to prevent anticircumvention technologies on digital devices containing their
copyrighted works, and the Supreme Court found that private
sharing of copyrighted music without a license was
infringement and commercial interests that facilitated such
private copying could be found liable for secondary
infringement.45 Congress seems to have become a “copyright
optimist,” if not an increasing number of the courts. This
historical tension between the natural rights justification for
intellectual property that Professor Goldstein found in the
“practical intuition and economic analysis” of American
intellectual history and the more cautious acceptance of
limited protection for intellectual property balanced with
other interests as claimed by Professor Netanel in the
Supreme Court jurisprudence reflects the heart of the
argument of this Article. The influence of the “property
rights” theory has risen and begun to displace the “traditional
incentives” theory in so far as judicial copyright doctrine on
the first sale privilege is concerned.
Armed with a natural rights foundation for intellectual
property, the adherents of the proprietary model that invests
(near) absolute control in the copyright holder would re-write
Article I, Section 8, clause 8, of the Constitution to state:

Of course that would require a constitutional
amendment, or would it?
Even assuming the “traditional incentives” model has
some vibrancy in the courts, most commentators agree that
defining and calibrating the optimal incentives mechanism
remains elusive, and in fact severely limits the usefulness of
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45. Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112
Stat. 2860 (enacted H.R. 2281) (1998). Grokster, 545 U.S. at 919 (The music
industry brought numerous lawsuits in the 2000’s against individuals for
private copying of music.).
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To reward the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for unlimited Times to authors (read: investors
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exclusive Right to their respective Writings [and
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46. Peter Menell wrote “recent work has shown that the holy grail of a
perfectly calibrated incentive system is unattainable.” Menell, supra note 20, at
163. William Fisher wrote that the practical necessity of integrating the
various incentive theories to produce a workable framework remained elusive.
Fisher, supra note 21, at 21. He concluded that, “[u]ntil that challenge is
successfully met, the power of the utilitarian approach to provide guidance to
lawmakers will be sharply limited.” Id. I would note that Fisher’s use of term
“utilitarian approach” is associated with that strand of utilitarian theory
supporting the “traditional incentives” model where protection is “balanced”
against access by users of creative works in order to optimize societal welfare.
The other strand of utilitarian theory that supports the Demsetz model argues
that societal welfare is optimized by maximizing protection and thus no
balancing is required.
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the utilitarian theory.46
Courts, however, do not have the luxury of waiting for
proven theory and must make decisions which arguably are
motivated by underlying assumptions about the effect and
impact of their decisions on real actors in society, the
copyright holders (authors or their investors), business
interests not aligned with copyright holders, and the
consuming public itself. Yet, coherent but divergent outcomes
for similar fact patterns will occur because of the lack of
consensus on the appropriate theory for copyright
justification.
For example, assume that a music producer seeks to limit
the ability of a consumer to transfer a copy of a CD to a third
party (the CD copy is authentic and rightfully in the
possession of the consumer). The same music producer sues
different consumers on similar fact patterns in different
courts. In each case the CD had been packaged with a
“license agreement” that contained language consistent with
Ninth Circuit’s decision in Vernor v. Autodesk. One district
court, whose reasoning follows the “property rights” paradigm
that “maximal control” by the asset owner is justified by the
underlying economic theory—and natural rights philosophy
associated with that view—finds in favor of the music
producer; holding that the CD may only remain in the
indefinite possession of the original purchaser. This strand of
utilitarian theory, namely the Demsetz economic model, does
not associate too much protection with monopoly
inefficiencies.
Professor Goldstein’s depiction of the
“copyright optimists” and Judge Easterbrook’s ProCD opinion
illustrate the paradigm’s central tenet that more protection is
directly related to more societal welfare and the market

31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 18 Side A

04/16/2012 17:10:32

SHERIDAN FINAL

2012]

3/29/2012 2:22:16 PM

RISE OF PROPERTY RIGHTS THEORY

313

implicitly minimizes the existence of negative externalities.
In the opposite case, an outcome finding against the
music producer has justificatory force for a court whose
rationale followed the theory that there is a point where overprotection leads to monopoly inefficiencies. Similarly if
societal welfare is defined more broadly than wealth
maximization, then an outcome which valued access to
creative works for purposes of fair use and secondary markets
for their independent contribution to societal welfare would
have even greater justificatory force.
The “traditional incentives” scholarship referred to the
protection-access paradigm where on the one end too much
protection created inefficiencies and on the other end too
much access dis-incentivized creative production.
For
purposes of this Article, the focus is on the pendulum
swinging between a model of (near) absolute control by the
copyright holder, which I have termed a “property rights”
theory or paradigm of copyright, and something less than
absolute control, which I have adopted the term “traditional
incentives” theory or model of copyright, where limits on the
copyright holder’s ability to control the distribution of its
work are acknowledged and supported.
B. Context

04/16/2012 17:10:32

47. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1998); CONTU stands for Commission on New
Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works.
48. See infra notes 59–72, 223–26, and accompanying text.
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Before turning to the main argument of the Article
contained in Parts II and III, it is helpful to set the stage by
examining a myriad of topics all related to judicial and
legislative treatment of software.
First, CONTU, the
commission established by Congress to consider the
appropriate treatment of computer programs (software), is
discussed as well as the statute that was produced by that
process, § 117, the essential copying doctrine.47 Next, the
Article discusses the legislative histories of § 117 and § 109,
the first sale doctrine, because the commentators and courts
have relied on constructions of § 117 to inform § 109
decisions.48 Vernor II relied on its prior construction of § 117
for its rationale and outcome of its decision concerning § 109’s
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first sale doctrine.49 Also, the court’s construction of § 117
has been infused with strong “property rights” theory spilling
over to § 109’s construction as well.
Next, the Article examines several judicial decisions of
the circuit courts in the 1990’s and early 2000’s that involved
software licensing for the role they played in later decisions,
especially those relevant to the main discussion of this
Article. A central tenet of this Article, namely that the
contemporary pro-software decisions suffered from an
analytical error of confusing contract for copyright analysis,
can be traced to the analytical approach of these early
decisions of ProCD v. Zeidenberg50 and Bowers v. Baystate.51
These decisions also represented the displacement of the
“traditional incentives” theory by rise of the “property rights”
theory of justification for the special protection afforded
copyright holders. Since the decisions couched their opinions
in contract reasoning, the jurisprudential copyright theory at
work in the rationale of the courts was not detected. This
confusion infected the later first sale software decisions as
well as the commentary on these decisions that continued to
be distracted by the contract critique. Finally, the Article
discusses the attempted passage of Article 2B to the UCC,
which was meant to resolve some questions related to
software licensing, because of its heated debate and
particular effect on the commentary during the 1990’s
surrounding treatment of software transactions.
In 1983, the Third Circuit found software to be
Also, Congress had
copyrightable subject matter.52
commissioned a group named CONTU to study and
recommend legislation for the treatment of computer
programs (referred to herein as software) in the intellectual
property legal regime.53 Based on their recommendations,
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49. See Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc. (Vernor II), 621 F.3d 1102, 1115 (9th Cir.
2010).
50. ProCD v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996)
51. Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
52. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240,
1253 (3d Cir. 1983).
53. See Richard H. Stern, Section 117 of the Copyright Act: Charter of the
Software Users’ Rights or an Illusory Promise?, 7 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 459, 460
(1985).
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Congress passed § 117 of the Computer Software Copyright
Act in 1980.54 Section 117 known as the “essential copying”
doctrine was designed to provide a safe harbor for software
users from triggering the right of reproduction in the normal
operation of their software.55 By the late 1980’s there was
significant criticism by scholars of the construction of § 117 by
the courts, which were finding that many software users did
not qualify for the benefits of the statute.56
Ironically the stated purpose of § 117 had been to solve
the problem of the pre-digital Copyright Act, namely that
“use” of the computer program involved the exclusive right to
reproduce.57 Think of the pre-digital example of a book. To
read a book, or make normal use of it, did not invoke the
copyright holder’s exclusive right of reproduction. Reading a
digital book on a computer (or other digital device) does
invoke that right as the computer (or other electronic device)
automatically makes copies of digital content in the
processing of the data. Without a license from the copyright
holder or some other exemption, the user is committing
copyright infringement which can carry serious penalties.58
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54. Id.
55. Id. at 461–66.
56. Id. at 483–85. Stern’s reference to the phrase, “illusory promise” in his
title, was the effect, he argued, for software users because of the court’s narrow
construction of § 117. Id. Stern wrote that Congress’ act to replace “rightful
possessor” with “owner,” amounted to a “modification [that] left the door open to
extensive sleight of hand in the name of bailments, leases, licenses and other
putatively non-sale transactions.” Id. at 467 (emphasis in original); see also
Pamela Samuelson, Modifying Copyrighted Software: Adjusting Copyright
Doctrine to Accommodate a New Technology, 28 JURIMETRICS J. 179, 191–92,
221 (1988) (Samuelson criticized CONTU as well as Congress for failure to
satisfactorily ensure software users the ability to make essential copies and
adaptations. Samuelson argued for a private person use exemption as an
extension of the fair use holding of Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios,
Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984)).
57. See Robert A. Kreis, Section 117 of the Copyright Act, 1991 BYU L. REV.
1497, 1522 (1991); Stern, supra note 53, at 463.
58. See Aaron Perzanowski, Fixing RAM Copies, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1067,
1070 (2010). Professor Perzanowski discussed the “RAM Copy Doctrine”
established by the Ninth Circuit in its decision, MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak
Computer, 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993). Perzanowski noted that the Ninth
Circuit sided with the copyright holders and the decision over time came to
stand for “the notion that all RAM instantiations, however fleeting, are copies.”
Cf. Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 139–40 (2nd Cir.
2008). In this more recent decision by the Second Circuit, Perzanowski noted
that “[a]lthough Peak continues to represent the dominant approach, the Second
Circuit’s decision in Cartoon Network v. CSC Holdings suggests that courts
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Nevertheless, the courts have been comfortable, in fact
motivated to agree with the software producer’s
characterization of ownership thereby depriving most
software users (i.e. licensees are not owners) of the benefit of
§ 117’s safe harbor from copyright infringement.
2. Legislative History of §§ 109 and 117
The legislative history of §§ 109 and 117 does not lend
great support for a broad or synthetic view of ownership
favored by the critics of the pro-software producer decisions.59
The statutory language of both § 109 and § 117 uses the term
“owner” when referring to the possessor of a copy.60 CONTU
had recommended that § 117 apply to all “rightful
possessors.”61 Without explanation Congress substituted the
term “owner” for “rightful possessor.”62 Despite inquiry to the
Copyright Office, no explanation has been provided for this
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remain willing to consider claims of infringement based on temporary
instantiations with sensitivity to the unique facts of particular cases.” See
Perzanowski, at 1080. On November 10, 2011, the RIAA sent a cease and desist
letter to ReDigi, Inc. claiming that its business of assisting legitimate owners of
digital music to resell copies of their music constituted copyright infringement.
Matthew Laser, RIAA wants ReDigi out of the business of selling “used”
iTunes tracks, ARS TECHNICA (Nov. 15, 2011), http://arstechnica.com/techpolicy/news/2011/11/riaa-wants-redigi-out-of-the-business-of-selling-used-itunes
-tracks.ars (last visited Nov. 29, 2011). ReDigi ensures that the original copy of
music is deleted but in the process of transferring the copy a second copy of the
digital song is created. As the RIAA pointed out there is no digital first sale
right. Id. If this were found to be willful infringement penalties can be as high
as $150,000 per work infringed (as the RIAA points out). Id. There is no
decision on whether this practice would be considered fair use. Id.
59. See Kreis, supra note 57, at 1516, 1536–37, 1539 (Kreis claimed that
Congress had made a conscious decision to not follow the recommendations of
CONTU and use the term “rightful possessor.” Id. at 1537. He also claimed
that Congress knew how to use that term because in the 1990 amendment to
Section 109 (b) (1) to prohibit rentals of computer software programs, Congress
used both terms “owner” and “possessor.” Id. at 1536. The broader category of
a person in “possession” of a copy of a computer program was used to define
those parties who did not have right under first sale doctrine to rent their
copies. In contrast, the text of Section 109 (a) containing the first sale doctrine
itself contains the narrow term “owner.” Id. Kreiss argued, however, that
“rightful possessors” of computer programs without benefit of formal title have
the right to make essential copies and archival copies of the program in the
normal operation of the computer running the programs through contract
theory of implied license. Id. at 1539. That view still would not give software
users the right to sell or otherwise alienate the copy of software.).
60. 17 U.S.C. §§ 109, 117 (1998).
61. Stern, supra note 53, at 460 n.8; Samuelson, supra note 56, at 188.
62. Samuelson, supra note 56, at 188.
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63. See Stern, supra note 53, at 460.
64. See MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, 991 F.2d 511, 519 n.5 (9th Cir.
1993).
65. See infra note 224 and accompanying text.
66. See Stern, supra note 53, at 467 (The implication is that Congress made
an affirmative choice to narrow the scope of the intended beneficiary of the
statute from the broader category of possessor despite the recommendation of
CONTU).
67. See Samuelson, supra note 56, at 188–89.
68. See Stephen Kyle Tapp & Daniel E. Wanat, Computer Software
Copyright Issues: Section 117 and Fair Use, 22 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 197 (1992).
69. See id. at 214–15, 215 n.67.
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change and the legislative history is silent.63 MAI v. Peak64
was the first circuit court decision to interpret the term
“owner” in the context of § 117. As discussed infra, the Ninth
Circuit offered little rationale or reasoning but found that the
magic words of “license” controlling, with the effect that the
software users did not have the benefit of § 117.65
As commentators have noted, Congress’ affirmative act to
replace “rightful possessor” with “owner” in § 117 weighs
against the argument that “possession” is enough based on
traditional statutory construction.66 If not in 1980, certainly
in 1998 when § 117 was amended, Congress would have
known that the standard license agreement governing
distribution of software contained language stating that the
user is a licensee not an owner of a copy of software. The
effect of using the term “owner” not “rightful possessor” in the
statutory language was to give software publishers greater
control over the distribution of their software.67
Commentators have argued that Congress appeared to
intend the narrower construction in § 109 as well. In an
article written by Stephen Kyle Tapp and Daniel E. Wanat in
1991, they noted that Congress had an opportunity in 1984
and 1990 when amending § 109 to amend subsection (d)
which limits the application of § 109, or the first sale doctrine,
to those in possession of a copy but have not acquired
ownership of it.68 Tapp and Wanat noted that if the amended
§ 117 was to be read in harmony with § 109 (a) and (d) an
owner of a copy only, and not a possessor, would be granted
the privileges embodied within both sections.69
The upshot has been a very narrow construction of the
essential copying doctrine such that if the copyright holder
(e.g., software producer) unilaterally claims that its
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users/licensees are not owners the court has upheld that
characterization.70 To make matters worse, courts have been
inclined to inject a narrow, “property rights” driven
construction of § 117 into their reasoning for § 109 first sale
doctrine decisions involving software. As will be discussed
infra, the Ninth Circuit in Vernor v. Autodesk (Vernor II)
found no difficulty relying on its prior construction of § 117 to
resolve a § 109 case.71 The Ninth Circuit added a few bells
and whistles, constructing a multi-factor test that was
substantively equivalent to their prior § 117 rationale.72
The problem with this approach is that it fails to examine
the different underlying purposes of §§ 109 and 117. Section
117 came into being as a narrow statutory doctrine with the
purpose of conforming the practical realities of software use
to traditional copyright principles. Even if arguably that
purpose has been thwarted by the software industry’s
licensing practices and courts recognition of such, the history
and purpose of § 109 is much larger. It was born of common
law doctrine, and then codified into statute. Over a century
old, it has traditionally been associated with serving one of
the primary interests of copyright, namely the availability
and accessibility of creative works to society. I argue that
courts should exercise greater scrutiny to distinguish these
legislative acts and give greater deference to a vibrant, robust
first sale doctrine. This would further the venerable purpose
of the doctrine and the broader interests of copyright.
Turning to the significant decisions of the period related
to software, there were the circuit court decisions of StepSaver v. Wyse Tech73 in the Third Circuit, ProCD v.
Zeidenberg74 in the Seventh Circuit, and Bowers v. Baystate75
in the Federal Circuit.
In 1991, in Step-Saver, the Third Circuit addressed the
question of whether an end user license agreement (“EULA”)
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70. Id. at 239.
71. See Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc. (Vernor II), 621 F.3d 1102, 1114–15 (9th
Cir. 2010).
72. Id. at 1110–11.
73. Step-Saver Data Sys. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1991).
74. ProCD v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
75. Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
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76. See Step-Saver, 939 F.2d at 93.
77. Id. at 105–06. The Third Circuit relied on its construction of UCC § 2207—often referred to as the “battle of the forms” provision. Id.
78. Id. at 96 n.7.
79. See id.
80. ProCD v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1455 (7th Cir. 1996). The rationale
of ProCD reflects the influence of the utilitarian branch of “property rights”
paradigm inspired by Demsetz economic theory. It supports maximal control of
copyrighted works and believes that price discrimination will lead to optimal
allocation of creative works. First sale poses leakage to the model and is
disfavored.
81. See id. 1452–53.
82. Id. at 1453–54.
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that disclaimed UCC warranties was enforceable against a
buyer of software who alleged that he had not assented to
those terms.76 The Third Circuit applied the UCC but found
that the EULA attached to the product constituted an
additional term after purchase of the product and had been
rejected by the buyer.77 The court held for the buyer. In
response to the software producer claiming this decision
would have dire consequences for the industry, Judge
Wisdom, author of the Step-Saver opinion, included a lengthy
(and often quoted) footnote on his view of software licensing
practices. Judge Wisdom noted that software producers
started their licensing practices in the 1980’s in an effort to
avoid first sale doctrine because they feared the rental and
copying of their software.78 With the 1990 amendment to §
109 prohibiting rental of computer programs, Judge Wisdom
believed that it was no longer necessary for software
producers to structure their transaction as a license rather
than a sale, referring to the “fiction” of the license.79
Following this decision, Judge Easterbrook authored the
ProCD opinion in 1996 for the Seventh Circuit, and found a
EULA enforceable where the user/licensee was restricted
from using the software for commercial purposes.80
Construing the UCC and relying on contract principles, the
Seventh Circuit distinguished Step-Saver, declaring UCC
section 2-207 irrelevant to the case, and relying on a
construction of UCC section 2-204 and UCC section 2-606.81
ProCD also found no preemption of copyright law, noting that
generally private contracts are not affected by preemption.82
Language in the opinion waxed prolifically about the
importance of private ordering to the optimal functioning of
the markets and society, evidencing a “property rights” theory
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of copyright.83
The Seventh Circuit was sensitive to the fact that it
relied on contract reasoning rather than copyright analysis.
As if anticipating the criticism that followed, the opinion
expressed the limited scope of its (intended) effect by noting:
A copyright is a right against the world. Contracts, by
contrast, generally affect only their parties; strangers may
do as they please, so contracts do not create “exclusive
rights.” Someone who found a copy of SelectPhone
(trademark) on the street would not be affected by the
shrinkwrap license—though the federal copyright laws of
their own force would limit the finder’s ability to copy or
transmit the application program.84

04/16/2012 17:10:32

83. Id. at 1454–55. ProCD was influenced by the Supreme Court decision,
Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991), which found that the forum
selection clause on the back of a pre-printed ticket sent to the buyer after
payment had been made was enforceable. Carnival Cruise, 499 U.S. at 596.
ProCD analogized generally to the custom in the travel, entertainment and
insurance industries where money now, terms later is normal course of
business. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1454–55. Of course those service businesses do not
have the benefit of a federally created right in copyright granting them special
protection in the marketplace.
84. See id. at 1454.
85. See Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc. (Vernor II), 621 F.3d 1102, 1102 (9th Cir.
2010).
86. See Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317, 1317, 1323–24 (Fed.
Cir. 2003).
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Lacking the benefit of prophetic foresight, the Seventh
Circuit had no idea that less than a decade later the Ninth
Circuit would essentially find that someone picking up a copy
of a software on the street could be obligated to comply with
similar restrictions as those of ProCD.85 The flaw in ProCD’s
reasoning was finding privity, upon which a contract analysis
depends. More striking was that this defect didn’t prevent a
sweeping statement that copyright is a right against the
world, but contract is limited to its parties. Belief in the
exclusive role of markets, an integral part of the “property
rights” theory of intellectual property, helps to explain this
irrational exuberance.
In 2002, the Federal Circuit, in Bowers, addressed the
question of whether a shrink wrap license (EULA) could
contract away the fair use right of reverse engineering
software established by judicial doctrine.86 In that case,
Baystate (accused of copyright infringement by reverse
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engineering Bower’s software) obtained copies of the software
product according to the opinion.87 What did that mean? He
picked up a copy at his local retail store? As the dissent
correctly pointed out there was not a negotiated contract and
it was a stretch of the imagination to pretend there was
“mutual assent” to the “waiver” of the judicial doctrine
establishing a fair use right to reverse engineer software to
obtain access to non-protectable ideas buried in the source
code of the program.88
Bowers’ majority argued that they were following ProCD
and famously quoted from the opinion about the difference
between copyright and contract.89 What difference is there,
as the dissent pointed out, if a simple EULA (read: notice) is
slapped on every retail package distributed around the
world?90
The mere presence of a shrink wrap license agreement
does not prove mutual assent as the Federal Circuit claimed
in Bowers.91 More importantly it does not prove privity, a
bedrock principle of contract theory for assigning rights and
duties. That is the fallacy of logic that began with ProCD,
continued through Bowers, then leaped further into
imaginary space in the pro-software first sale decisions. As
the district judge pointed out in ProCD the software user
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87. Id. at 1322.
88. Id. at 1336–37 (Prior circuit doctrine had established that reverse
engineering source code to obtain access to unprotected elements of the code
may be protectable activity under the fair use doctrine as it supports innovation
through the promotion of interoperability of products.)
89. Id. at 1325.
90. Id. at 1336–37 (citing Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.,
489 U.S. 141, 157 (2005)). Judge Dyk wrote in his dissent that the majority’s
ruling was akin to a “black dot” state law that could not be upheld. Id. He
argued that:
[a] state is not free to eliminate the fair use defense. Enforcement of a
total ban on reverse engineering would conflict with the Copyright Act
itself by protecting otherwise unprotectable [sic] material. If state law
provided that a copyright holder could bar fair use of the copyrighted
material by placing a black dot on each copy of the work offered for
sale, there would be no question but that the state law would be
preempted. A state law that allowed a copyright holder to simply label
its products so as to eliminate a fair use defense would ‘substantially
impede’ the public's right to fair use and allow the copyright holder,
through state law, to protect material that the Congress has
determined must be free to all under the Copyright Act.
Id.
91. See id. at 1323–24.
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never assented to the shrink wrap agreement that purported
to restrict his use of the software to non-commercial uses.92
Zeidenberg purchased the software at a local retail store,
according to the opinion, not directly from ProCD, the
software retailer.93 Where is the privity between ProCD and
Zeidenberg? Both ProCD and earlier court in Step-Saver
applied UCC provisions to the outcome of their decisions.94
The courts have implicitly (without express UCC provisions)
attached “restrictions” (rather than benefits) that affect
downstream parties (i.e. end users) who legitimately
purchase the software product.95
Despite the Seventh Circuit’s famous claim that its
decision grounded in contract was not a claim against the
world, the effect of its reasoning, conflating contract analysis
with copyright analysis, was to lay the groundwork and basis
for just that—a contract, called a EULA, operating as a right
against the world, against every anonymous retailer, and
consumer purchasing a software product with a EULA (read:
notice) affixed to it.96
The fatal flaw inherent in this analysis is the fiction of
“mutual assent” and “implied privity” as cover for a multitude
of sins. Instead of transparently arguing for unlimited,
unfettered property right of the copyright holder justified in
copyright, the courts found copyright infringement, favoring
content producer (namely software producers in these
decisions) but relied on a contract analysis. The fiction of the
31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 22 Side B
04/16/2012 17:10:32

92. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 908 F. Supp 640, 644 (W.D. Wis. 1996).
93. Id. at 645.
94. See ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1447; Step-Saver Data Sys. v. Wyse Tech., 939
F.2d 91, 91 (3d Cir. 1991).
95. There seems to be a reverse logic in how courts have considered the
UCC in the context of software transactions. Traditionally manufacturers
avoided exposure to consumers of UCC warranties by asserting a lack of vertical
privity with the consumers. UCC 2-318 modified the common law rule that a
seller’s warranties only apply to the party in privity. This provision attaches
the warranties to downstream parties that have contact with the product.
Depending on the alternative rule adopted by the state, the immediate
family/household may be the beneficiary of the warranty or more broadly any
person who could reasonably be expected to “use, consume or be affected” by the
goods.
96. See Mark A. Lemley, Beyond Preemption: The Law and Policy of
Intellectual Property Licensing, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 111, 148 (1999) [hereinafter
Beyond Preemption] (Lemley argued that the passage of UCC2B would “usher
in an era of ‘private legislation.’ ” ). Notwithstanding the (general) failure of
adoption of UCC2B, I argue that judicial doctrine is accomplishing that goal.
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license that Step-Saver referred to is really the fiction of
“mutual assent” as cover for a copyright theory of unlimited
property rights invested in the content producer.
4. UCC 2B

04/16/2012 17:10:32

97. See id. at 118–26, 136–46.
98. Id.
99. See Dorte Toft, Opponents Blast Proposed Software Law, CNN.COM, Jul.
12, 1999, http://www.cnn.com/TECH/computing/9907/12/ucita.idg/index.html.
UCC2B was originally a project of the ALI and NCCUSL to draft and support
state by state adoption of a new article to the UCC to address specifically
information technology transactions including software. UCITA 101 & 102,
AMERICAN LIBRARY ASSOCIATION, http://www.ala.org/ala/issuesadvocacy/
copyright/ucita/ucita101.cfm (last visited Nov. 28, 2011); There was a great deal
of controversy and criticism of initial drafts by consumer groups including
Americans for Fair Electronic Commerce (“AFFECT”), American Library
Association, State AG’s, IT professional organizations, even the FTC and many
scholars.
Id.; UCITA: Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act,
JAMESSHUGGINS.COM, http://www.jamesshuggins.com/h/tek1/ucita.htm (last
visited Dec. 13, 2011). In April 1999, ALI withdrew. NCCUSL continued its
efforts, renaming the article UCITA (stand-alone legislation) and hoped to gain
state-by-state passage. By 2000 they had two states adopt the law, Virginia and
Maryland. UCITA Online: The Uniform Computer Information Transactions
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This section briefly reviews the controversy over the
passage of UCC2B as another influential factor in the debate
over the contemporary software decisions. During the 1990’s
the heated debate and controversy over the passage of a
separate article to the UCC to govern transactions involving
computer software, entitled UCC2B, framed the debate as one
focused on contract theory and nominally questions of
preemption.97 UCC2B proposed a separate section to the
UCC for the establishment of default rules for the treatment
of contracts involving computer information, i.e., software.
These proposed rules included terms about warranties and
self-help remedies that a software producer could avail itself
of in event of a defaulting customer. The criticism of UCC2B
was that it would contract away rights that software users
would otherwise enjoy under existing statute or judicial
doctrine, including the right to transfer a copy of their
software, or the right to reverse engineer the software to
obtain the underlying “ideas” not protected by copyright.98
UCC2B was generally perceived as pro-software industry and
criticized by a diverse group of parties including the
American Library Association, the FTC, several state AG’s
and many scholars, to name a few.99 Although it eventually
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Act (UCITA) is a Proposed State Contract Law, UCITAONLINE.COM,
http://www.ucitaonline.com (last visited Dec. 13, 2011); Uniform Computer
Information Transactions Act, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uniform_
Computer_Information_Transactions_Act (last visited Dec. 13, 2011),
However, four states, Iowa, Vermont, North Carolina, and West Virginia,
adopted “bomb-shelter” laws providing that their citizens were specifically
shielded from the effects of the law. See Alorie Gilbert, Supporters Back Away
From Software Bill, CNET News (Aug. 7, 2003), http://news.cnet.com/21001028-5061061.html.
100. See Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc. (Vernor II), 621 F.3d 1102, 1102 (9th Cir.
2010). The Ninth Circuit found that EULA prevented anyone who possessed a
copy of the software from exercising first sale rights to transfer a copy of the
software without permission of the software producer. Id. See Bowers v.
Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2003). The Federal Circuit
found that the EULA effectively prevented user from reverse engineering to
discover the unprotected elements of the software code, despite prior judicial
doctrine holding that that activity was deemed fair use. Id.
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failed as a legislative process, many of the stated fears of the
critics, notably that software producers would: (a) gain rights
to disclaim warranties through a EULA, (b) prevent reverse
engineering through a EULA, or (c) prevent transfer of a copy
of software through a EULA, have come true as part of the
judicial doctrine.100
At the dawn of the new millennium, there was a lack of
clarity in the law related to questions of software licensing.
Trends favoring the interests of software industry from the
prior decade included the Ninth Circuit’s assertion in MAI v.
Peak that for purposes of § 117 a software licensee is not an
owner of a copy of software, and the Seventh Circuit’s holding
in ProCD v. Zeidenberg that parties can “contract around”
copyright doctrine via a EULA, and that is good for society
because it furthers the practice of price discrimination.
Courts following the “property rights” theory of copyright
would be expected to sympathize with software industry’s
efforts to establish default rules in UCC2B, and arguably
inclined to develop judicial doctrine that reached the same
results.
During the period of 2000 to 2003, two district courts
sitting in the Ninth Circuit addressed the question of whether
a EULA could defeat the first sale doctrine when the party
asserting the first sale defense was a third party reseller
clearly not in privity with the software producer. All three
decisions involved the same software producer, Adobe, and
very similar fact patterns. The two district courts arrived at
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divergent outcomes with the Northern District favoring the
software producer, and the Central District favoring the
reseller defendant. The following section analyzes these
decisions and demonstrates how the courts’ express rationale
followed contract reasoning where the more coherent
justification for the divergent decisions lies in their adherence
to the competing copyright theories of “property rights” and
“traditional incentives.”
5.

Dueling Decisions on Software Licensing and First
Sale Doctrine

04/16/2012 17:10:32

101. See ProCD v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
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A great deal has changed in the economy and society
since 1908 when the Supreme Court fashioned the first sale
doctrine in its decision Bobbs-Merrill v. Straus. For the
consumer, the first sale doctrine has been clear in the hard
copy world of distribution of books, music and film. Even if
the consumer did not recognize the doctrine by name they
were familiar with the concept. The expectation that a book
purchased from a bookstore could later be given to a friend,
donated to the library or sold at a used bookstore would be a
familiar one.
The digital age has transformed how society accesses and
uses copyrighted works. In the 21st century, consumers have
become accustomed to purchasing software for their PC’s for
various purposes from utility, word processing and
accounting, to entertainment and games. Most consumers
have some vague idea that these products come with more
restrictions than their hard copy book purchased at the
bookstore (or online from vendor such as Amazon), but they
probably do not know the specific contours of these
restrictions. They probably do not read the terms of the
EULA that the software producer included with the software
product. It has become customary for software producers to
include a EULA that restricts transferability of the software
product and thus either totally or partially obstructs (or
arguably attempts to) the applicability of copyright law’s first
sale doctrine to the software product.
As discussed supra, ProCD found these EULAs
enforceable and their restrictions on the type of use of the
software binding on the purchaser of the software product.101
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In the trio of Adobe decisions discussed below, the ProCD
opinion is pushed to another level; it is not the user but a
reseller who has been sued for copyright infringement by the
software producer for attempting to ignore the license
restrictions contained in the EULA.
Despite ProCD’s
declaration that if someone picked up the software on the
street the license restriction would not be binding upon them,
the software producer, Adobe, argued that its restrictions
were binding even on someone who picked up the software on
the street, so to speak.102
At the dawn of the new millennium, three actions for
copyright infringement with very similar fact patterns were
decided with split decisions between two district courts. In
the initial decision, One Stop Micro v. Adobe Systems, Inc.,103
the district court of the Northern District of California found
in favor of the software producer holding that the first sale
doctrine did not apply. One year later in Softman Products
Co., LLC v. Adobe Systems, Inc.,104 the district court of the
Central District of California arrived at the opposite result,
finding against Adobe on grounds that first sale doctrine did
apply. Finally, in the following year, 2002, in Adobe Systems,
Inc. v. Stargate,105 its second decision involving Adobe and a
third reseller, the district court of the Northern District of
California again found that first sale doctrine did not apply.
As they both sit in the Ninth Circuit they could not help but
notice and respond to the other’s decision.
31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 24 Side B
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102. Id. The difference between ProCD’s fact situation on the one hand and
One Stop and Stargate on the other is that in the former the user/licensee was
the initial purchaser of the software. I critique the privity analysis of ProCD;
however, I also argue that even ProCD’s purported limited scope was violated in
the One Stop and Stargate decisions. ProCD argued that the initial purchaser
had privity but that someone else who happened to obtain copies of the software
could not be held to the restrictions contained in the EULA. Id. at 1454. One
Stop and Stargate had fact patterns where the resellers had obtained the copies
of software from third parties rather than directly from the software producer,
or the software producer’s distributor or retailer. See infra notes 103–05 and
accompanying text.
Nevertheless the restrictions including similar use
restrictions as ProCD were found enforceable as a copyright action.
103. Adobe Sys. Inc. v. One Stop Micro, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 2d 1086 (N.D. Cal.
2000).
104. SoftMan Prods. Co. v. Adobe Sys. Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 1075 (C.D. Cal.
2001).
105. Adobe Sys. Inc. v. Stargate Software Inc., 216 F. Supp. 2d 1051 (N.D.
Cal. 2002).
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106. See One Stop, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 1088; SoftMan, 171 F. Supp. 2d at 1080;
Stargate, 216 F. Supp. 2d at 1052.
107. Id.
108. Id.
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In every case, Adobe sued the reseller for copyright
infringement based on violations of its licensing agreements.
These were authentic copies but Adobe argued that its license
agreements conditioned its exclusive right of distribution
such that any violation of these restrictions constituted
copyright infringement. In each case, the reseller argued that
its distribution was protected by the first sale doctrine. In
some instances, it was a restriction specifying that
distribution was limited to only educational users, and in
others it was a bundling restriction, i.e., the software disks
could not be unbundled and sold separately.106 Adobe argued
that it licensed rather than sold all copies of its software so
the first sale doctrine did not apply.107 Since it had licensed
certain software with restrictions and the resellers in
question violated the terms of the license, Adobe argued that
these resellers were infringing its copyright.108
On very similar fact patterns, the two district courts
reached diametrically different outcomes. In all three cases,
there was a) no privity between the software producer and
the three different software resellers, b) a cause of action
brought by software producer in copyright, and c) the
situation where the software producer attempted to enforce
license restrictions similar to ProCD. All three courts avoided
developing a strong rationale based on copyright theory, and
their contract approach was foundationally weak for the lack
of privity and mutual assent, bedrock principles of contract
theory.
Next, this Article turns to the commentary on these first
sale decisions involving software. The distraction of the
contract critique led to a failure to scrutinize the heritage of
these decisions and to recognize the shift in the theoretical
justification of copyright underlying the pro-software
decisions.
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6. Academic Commentary on First Sale Software
Decisions

04/16/2012 17:10:32

109. John A. Rothchild, The Incredible Shrinking First-Sale Rule: Are
Software Resale Limits Lawful?, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 1 (2004).
110. Carver, supra note 12.
111. See Rothchild, supra note 109, at 37.
112. Id. at 39.
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Scholars have been unpersuasive in their arguments that
a “rightful possessor” of a copyrighted work should benefit
from the same privileges under copyright as an “owner.” As
described supra, the courts have largely followed the opposite
course, borrowing the very narrow statutory construction of
“owner” from § 117 decisions, and adopting the software
producer’s characterization of the transaction as a “license”
not a “sale” as expressed in the software industry’s standard
EULA.
The commentary’s critical analysis of the prosoftware first sale decisions has failed to emphasize the
flawed contract reasoning employed by the courts in the
express reasoning of their decisions, or to draw attention to
the underlying copyright rationale at work in these decisions.
This section examines two articles focused directly on
software licensing and first sale doctrine, which include the
2004 article by John A. Rothchild, The Incredible Shrinking
First Sale Rule: Are Software Resale Limits Lawful,109 and the
recent article by Brian Carver, Why License Agreements Do
Not Control Copy Ownership: First Sales and Essential
Copies.110 Both articles critique the current trend by courts to
uphold the software industry’s position that the license
transaction is a license not a sale, and first sale is not
triggered. They rely on arguments based on the UCC,
general commercial law, and analogous patent decisions,
rather than the heritage and theoretical foundation of the
pro-software first sale decisions.
The Incredible Shrinking First Sale Rule argued that
software publishers employed a strategy of preventing users
of software from gaining ownership rights through their
distribution strategy of restrictive license agreements.111 The
article went on to argue that this strategy failed because the
UCC would not recognize these restrictions on title.112
Unfortunately the article provided no authority supporting
this specific point that the UCC prevents software publishers
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from restricting the transfer of title in copies of their
copyrighted works.
The only judicial support for the statement that
restrictions on title would not be recognized was a 1907 Sixth
Circuit decision involving patent law and price
discrimination. In John D. Park & Sons Co. v. Hartman,113
an opinion by Judge, later Supreme Court Justice, Lurton,
involved a drug manufacturer that based on its proprietary
formula attempted to exercise price control over the
distribution of its products.114 The attempt to enforce the
price restrictions was struck down.115 It was a leap to go from
a patent license attempting price control to a copyright
license retaining rights of ownership and restricting manner
(not price) of distribution of the copyrighted material.
Neither the legal theory nor the facts underlying Hartman
supported a convincing rationale for its connection to or
critique of the contemporary pro-software decisions.
Nevertheless, after citing Hartman, the article continued its
argument by stating:
Thus, if a software publisher sells software copies to a
distributor, who is bound contractually to distribute the
copies only to specified users or under specified
circumstances, but who faithlessly distributes the copies
in violation of the contract, the transaction nonetheless
transfers good title to the acquirer.116

Park & Sons Co. v. Hartman, 153 F. 24 (6th Cir. 1907).
See Rothchild, supra note 109, at 41–42.
Id. at 42.
Id. at 42–43.
Id. at 42–43 n.151.
Id.
Id. at 27 n.84.

04/16/2012 17:10:32

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
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This statement was supported by a footnote with two
lengthy paragraphs. The first paragraph began, Courts that
have failed to appreciate this point, then went on to list
several decisions including the decisions of One Stop and
Stargate.117 The next paragraph stated, “courts that have
applied the principle correctly” and cited the decision of
Softman.118 There were no circuit court decisions involving
copyright and first sale supporting the statement. In another
footnote, the article conceded that “the majority of courts
conclude that copies of software are licensed, not sold.”119 In
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Id. at 28 n.85.
Id. at 39–40.
Platt & Monk Co. v. Republic Graphics, Inc., 315 F.2d 847 (2d Cir.
Am. Int’l Pictures, Inc. v. Foreman, 576 F.2d 661 (5th Cir. 1978).
See infra notes 142–72 and accompanying text.
Am. Int’l Pictures, Inc., 576 F.2d 661.
Id.
See Carver, supra note 12, at 1925–29.
Id. at 1899–1901.
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120.
121.
122.
1963).
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
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the following footnote, the article acknowledged that this was
the view of the Copyright Office.120 The article seemed to
offer more support for the opposite view it claimed to be
taking.
Next, the article attempted to analogize to commercial
law arguing that such limitations may create a security
interest, as an academic point.121 There was no judicial
authority to support this claim. As discussed infra the procontent producers’ decisions, beginning with Platt & Munk
Co., Inc., v. Republic Graphics, Inc.122 and American
International Pictures v. Foreman,123 view intellectual
property as special, and not subject to same treatment as
other tangible property.124
In American International
Pictures, the Fifth Circuit expressly held that copyright
holders could effectively restrict transfer of title in their
copyrighted works through the use of license agreements.125
In this 1978 decision, film producers successfully argued that
the first sale doctrine did not apply to the resale of film
prints.126 The Incredible Shrinking First Sale Rule: Are
Software Resale Limits Lawful overlooked this decision.
Until the underlying rationale for this view is examined and
critiqued, it will be difficult to move beyond the current
majority view of the courts.
The article, Why License Agreements Do Not Control Copy
Ownership: First Sales and Essential Copies, made the
argument that indefinite possession should be the dispositive
factor determining ownership in a copy, and the courts have
it wrong.127 In a section with the heading “Magic Words
Cases,” the article argued that a line of decisions which held
that a license agreement did control ownership were all in
error.128 It included the line of Ninth Circuit § 117 decisions
referred to as MAI Trio as the progenitor of this unfortunate
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The criticism of MAI echoed by earlier
occurrence.129
commentators was its lack of substantive analysis or
rationale for its conclusion (contained in a footnote) that,
“Since MAI (software producer) licensed its software, the
Peak customers do not qualify as ‘owners’ of the software and
are not eligible for protection under § 117.”130 As will be
discussed infra, Vernor II did rely on MAI Trio for its finding
in favor of the software producer.131
The article cited the 1994 district court decision,
Microsoft v. Harmony132 as another example of a decision
Neither the
failing to apply the correct reasoning.133
precedent cited by Harmony, nor the express reliance on
copyright rather than contract analysis by the decision, is
explored in this article. A focus on the flaws inherent in the
contract analysis as well as an investigation of the copyright
theory heritage of the pro-software decisions may have led to
a more persuasive critique of those decisions.
The article analogized to the patent exhaustion decisions
where the Supreme Court found limits on the patent holder’s
control of its distribution right: the recent Supreme Court
decision, Quanta v. LG Electronics,134 decided in 2008, and
the legacy decision of Motion Picture Patents v. Universal
Film Mfg. Co.,135 decided in 1917.136 These decisions involved
anti-competitive behavior of a different nature than in Vernor
II, and particularly in the case of Quanta, a fairly complex
fact pattern. Like Professor Samuelson wrote more than
31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 27 Side A
04/16/2012 17:10:32

129. Id.
130. See id. at 1900.
131. See infra Part II.E.
132. Microsoft Corp. v. Harmony Computers & Elecs., Inc., 846 F. Supp. 208
(E.D.N.Y. 1994).
133. See Carver, supra note 12, at 1901. Harmony was a software licensing
and first sale decision. Id. Professor Carver’s main criticism of Harmony was it
that it “furthered the unfortunate trend of short statements that fail to carefully
distinguish between copyright and copies, [when it wrote,] ‘Entering a license
agreement is not a ‘sale’ for purposes of the first sale doctrine.’ ” Id. In fact as
discussed infra, Harmony, unlike the MAI Trio, did rely on earlier authority to
support its application of copyright reasoning that found that the software
producer had demonstrated a course of conduct to retain title in the copies of
the work. See infra notes 190–94 and accompanying text. These earlier
influences on Harmony were not explored in this Article.
134. Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008).
135. Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502
(1917).
136. See Samuelson, supra note 56, at 195–96.
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137. See Samuelson, supra note 56, at 196.
138. Id. at 196 n.81.
139. Motion Picture Patents, 243 U.S. at 511.
140. In Motion Picture Patents, the patent holder had argued that its
patented film projectors could only be used in conjunction with film prints
supplied by it and any violation of this restriction constituted patent
infringement. Id. at 518. The Supreme Court held that a patent holder could
not extend the patent monopoly by mandating the use of non-patented supplies
with the patented product. Id. In Quanta Computer, the Supreme Court ruled
that patent exhaustion applied to the facts of the case and the patent holder
could not prevail on its claim of patent infringement. Quanta, 553 U.S. at 2122.
Professor Carver’s statement, relying on Quanta, that “the Supreme Court has
found all manner of contractual restrictions on the sale and use of a tangible
thing embodying a copyrighted or patent invention invalid” is overbroad.
Carver, supra note 12, at 1944. Neither Quanta nor Motion Pictures (which the
article discussed in the same section supporting the aforementioned statement)
addressed copyright. More importantly, Quanta specifically excluded a question
arising out of contract. Quanta, 553 U.S. at 2122 n.7.
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twenty years earlier in her article Modifying Copyrighted
Software: Adjusting Copyright Doctrine to Accommodate a
New Technology,137 Professor Carver’s article cited the
principles enunciated in Motion Picture Patents that criticized
restraints on alienation as “obnoxious to the public
interest.”138 Motion Picture Patents also contained the famous
statement by the Supreme Court that “the primary purpose of
our patent laws is not the creation of private fortunes for the
owners of the patents, but is ‘to promote progress of science
and the useful arts,’ ” referring to the balance of the monopoly
and the public interest.139 The principles enunciated could
have been developed further to support the argument for a
shift in the judicial doctrine of copyright.140
In contrast, this Article offers an explanatory analytical
framework for the pro-software decisions. In so doing, it
attempts to expose the underlying weaknesses of the
decisions’ express reasoning based on flawed contract
analysis and misplaced statutory construction. Rather than
focusing on the contract debate ostensibly at work in the
express reasoning of the decisions, this Article argues that
the competing copyright theories at work more coherently
explain the divergent outcomes of the decisions.
Parts II and III argue that the unifying rationale for the
divergent outcomes in the split decisions of One Stop and
Stargate on the one hand, and Softman on the other lies in
their underlying theoretical justification which yielded two
different models and rationales for copyright holders’ rights.
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141. ISC-Bunker Ramo Corp. v. Altech, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 1310 (N.D. Ill.
1990).

31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 28 Side A

As discussed in Part II, One Stop and Stargate are more
justifiably explained by tracing their heritage to several
earlier decisions involving not only software but also other
content, film prints and children’s toys. The “inherent rights”
copyright doctrine implicit in these pre-digital decisions
represents the “natural rights” branch in the “property
rights” paradigm of copyright. This copyright theory offers a
more coherent rationale for these decisions than the weak
foundational theory of contract.
Part II begins with an analysis of Platt because of its
articulation for the premise of “special” rights of intellectual
property, a concept that American International Pictures
applied to its first sale decision involving distribution of film
prints. American International Pictures, influenced by Platt,
articulated the “inherent rights” doctrine of copyright
ownership. This copyright doctrine, consistent with the
principles of the “property rights” justification for copyright
law, was followed in the subsequent software first sale
decisions of Microsoft v. Harmony and ISC-Bunker Ramo
Corp. v. Altech, Inc.141 As discussed infra, the contemporary
decisions, beginning with the district court level decisions of
One Stop and Stargate, through to the recent Ninth Circuit
decision, Vernor II committed the analytical error of
confusing contract analysis for copyright analysis; however,
all of these decisions can be rationalized with the “property
rights” theory of copyright. The decisions that found against
the software producer and construed the first sale doctrine
more broadly are best explained by adherence to the
“traditional incentives” theory of copyright.
Part III discusses Softman in the context of the
progenitor first sale decision, Bobbs-Merrill, as well as a line
of decisions finding for limitations on the copyright holder’s
power to retain title. These decisions support the “traditional
incentives” model of drawing a limit on the power of the
copyright holder in order to ensure the benefits of availability
and accessibility of creative works to the society at large. At
the moment this is the minority view of the courts, and
arguably overruled by precedent of Ninth Circuit in its recent
decision, Vernor II. Nevertheless, the theory and rationale of
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the “traditional incentives” model forms the best fit with the
progenitor first sale decision, Bobbs-Merrill, and fulfills those
promises made over a century ago.
II. PROPERTY RIGHTS THEORY AND THE PRO-COPYRIGHT HOLDER
DECISIONS

A. Special Nature of Copyright: One Stop and Back to Platt

142. See Adobe Sys. Inc. v. One Stop Micro, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1089
(N.D. Cal. 2000).

04/16/2012 17:10:32

The court in One Stop began its copyright analysis of the
first sale question by citing the current codification of the
doctrine in section 109(a) of the 1976 Copyright Act.142 Next,
it stated that “[t]he first sale doctrine is only triggered by an
actual sale. Accordingly, a copyright owner does not forfeit
his right of distribution by entering into a licensing

31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 28 Side B

Before reaching the contemporary software decisions
including Vernor II in the Ninth Circuit, this section traces
the heritage of the Northern District of California’s first prosoftware producer/first sale decision of One Stop to an early
pre-digital decision of the Fifth Circuit, American
International Pictures (AIP II) that involved the distribution
of film prints. Going further back, AIP II cited the Second
Circuit decision, Platt & Munk v. Republic Graphics, Inc.
(Platt), authored by Judge Friendly. Platt expressed support
for the principle that a federally created right of copyright is
treated differently when there is a clash or conflict with state
derived rights. Influenced by Platt, AIP II promulgated the
doctrine of “inherent rights” of copyright ownership, which
represents the natural rights branch of the “property rights”
paradigm of copyright. The software first sale decisions of
Harmony and ISC-Bunker cited AIP II, and clearly followed
its copyright rationale of the “inherent rights” doctrine (“AIP
II Trio”). One Stop represents the fragile link between AIP II
Trio decisions, and the recent decision of the Ninth Circuit,
Vernor v. Autodesk. The analytical break from copyright to
contract rationale was influenced by the factors discussed
supra. The most cogent explanation for the decisions of
Vernor II and the earlier pro-software first sale decisions of
One Stop and Stargate is the “property rights” paradigm of
copyright.
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143. Id.
144. Id.
145. See Microsoft Corp. v. Harmony Computers & Elecs., Inc., 846 F. Supp.
208, 212 (E.D.N.Y. 1994); ISC-Bunker, 765 F. Supp. at 1314.
146. See Am. Int’l Pictures, Inc. v. Foreman (AIP II), 576 F.2d 661, 664.
147. See Am. Int’l Pictures, Inc. v. Foreman (AIP I), 400 F. Supp. 928, 934–35
(S.D. Ala. 1975).
148. See AIP II, 576 F.2d at 664–65.
149. Id. at 664.
150. See Platt & Monk Co. v. Republic Graphics, Inc., 315 F.2d 847, 854 (2d
Cir. 1963).
151. Id. at 851–53.
152. Id. at 855.
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One Stop relied on Harmony and ISCagreement.”143
144
The authorities cited by these decisions can be
Bunker.
traced to the earlier Fifth Circuit decision, American
International Pictures v. Foreman.145
American International Pictures addressed the question
of burden of proof to prove title to a film print where the
defendant/reseller raised the first sale doctrine as a defense
to a claim of copyright infringement by the plaintiff/film
producers.146 The chain of title in the copies at issue was not
proved and the lower court found in favor of the party in
possession of the copyrighted article relying on common law
doctrines for real and personal property.147 The Fifth Circuit
not only reversed the lower court but criticized and rejected
its reasoning finding it inapplicable to a case involving
intellectual property.148
The Fifth Circuit cited and relied upon the earlier Second
Circuit decision authored by Judge Friendly, Platt & Munk
Co. v. Republic Graphics, Inc.149 In Platt, a decision in the
pre-digital era of 1963, the Second Circuit considered the
question of whether an unpaid manufacturer under contract
with a copyright holder could avail itself of the common law
self-help remedy of selling (otherwise disposing of) the
manufactured merchandise (under copyright protection) in
order to satisfy an unpaid bill by the copyright holder.150
Platt considered carefully the arguments of both sides,
copyright holder and manufacturer, and found both of them
unpersuasive.151 The Second Circuit chose a third path which
was to grant the unpaid manufacturer the right to seek
adjudication in court to determine whether the copyright
holder’s failure to satisfy the contract was unjustified.152
Only then would the manufacturer have the right under first
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sale doctrine to sell or otherwise dispose of the
merchandise.153
The Second Circuit devoted some effort to explaining the
control a copyright holder exercises in the rightful transfer of
its title in any object containing its copyright.154 In response
to the manufacturer arguing that it had lawful possession of
the merchandise for purposes of the first sale doctrine, the
Second Circuit cited the example of the book agent who had
rights of possession in a book, not authority to sell the book,
and thus the party who purchased the book never received
rightful title to the book.155 The Second Circuit stated:
[I]t does not matter whether the party offering to sell
without [the proprietor’s] authority be a thief, or one in
possession only by a breach of trust, or [by] some other
less blamable means of acquisition. The absence of [the
proprietor’s] authority to sell his literary property
constitutes the defect of title, no matter how that want of
authority arises. Owing to the peculiar character of
this kind of property, the absence of the author’s
authority to sell is a defect of title, and not a mere want of
power.156

Id.
Id. at 852.
Id. at 854.
Id. at 852 (emphasis added).
Id. at 854.
Id. at 855.

04/16/2012 17:10:32

153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
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The Second Circuit’s reference to an “absence of
authority” and “defect of title” appeared to support a strong
“property rights” approach; it implied that the property
owner, or copyright holder, must authorize the transfer of
title. The Second Circuit appeared to have implied that this
is the general rule but under certain circumstances
exceptions were warranted. The opinion turned to the
specific facts of the case and noted that under some
circumstances transfer of title could be compelled and that
this was one of those situations before the court.157 The
Second Circuit found that the copyright holder could not
unjustifiably avoid the obligations of a contract as it had
argued in the briefs.158
Nevertheless, the copyright holder was entitled to
differential treatment from a chattel owner (i.e. non-
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copyrighted property). Turning to the question of whether
the manufacturer could avail itself of the self-help remedy
available for chattel, the Second Circuit found special
preferences for a federal created right under copyright law:
Where the copyright owner makes a good faith claim that
its failure to pay for the goods was justified, the
manufacturer ought not to be allowed to resort to the
normal remedy of self-help with the result of impairing
the rights granted by federal copyright law; to that extent
state contract or lien law must yield to the federally
created right.159

04/16/2012 17:10:32

159. Id.

31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 30 Side A

Platt enunciated the principle that a federally created
right of copyright may be treated differently when there is a
clash or conflict with state derived rights. Platt did not cite
any direct authority for this principle. This raised the
question of why should manufactured goods, such as
childrens’ toys, in the Platt fact pattern be treated differently
because there was a copyright associated with those
particular manufactured goods? One explanation could be
the hierarchy of rights, copyright traces its source of
authority to the federal Constitution Article I. Platt was not
analyzed or decided on the basis of preemption so that does
not satisfactorily answer the question. Another possibility
relates to an assumption of the underlying theory of copyright
that motivated and drove the reasoning of Platt. As discussed
supra, copyright law (as well as patent law) has traditionally
rested on a utilitarian theoretical justification most commonly
understood as the “traditional incentives” model that
balances protection with access. However, natural rights
theory has also been a competing justification for copyright.
Platt evidenced a natural rights justification for copyright.
Its opinion included a great deal of doctrine supporting strong
rights for the copyright holder. As discussed below, the Fifth
Circuit in American International Pictures, was influenced by
this part of the Second Circuit’s opinion.
The reasoning of the opinion in AIP II evidenced a
doctrine referred to herein as “inherent rights” characterized
by strong ownership rights vested in the copyright holder.
This copyright doctrine runs through the subsequent software
first sale decisions of Harmony and ISC-Bunker. As dis-
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cussed infra, the “inherent rights” doctrine provides a more
coherent rationale for the pro-software outcomes than the
contract based reasoning expressed in the contemporary
decisions of One Stop, Stargate, and Vernor II.
B. Articulation of the “Inherent Rights” Doctrine of Copyright
Ownership: American International Pictures

See AIP II, 576 F.2d at 663–64.
See AIP I, 400 F. Supp. at 934–35.
See AIP II, 576 F.2d at 665–66.
Id. at 664.
See AIP I, 400 F. Supp. at 933.

04/16/2012 17:10:32

160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
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In its opinion, American International Pictures, the Fifth
Circuit addressed the question of burden of proof to prove
title to a film print.160 The defendant, a merchant trading in
film prints, had been sued by the film producers who argued
that they had not given authorization to transfer title to the
films. The lower court found in favor of the defendant, the
party in possession of the copyrighted article, relying on
common law doctrines for real and personal property.161
Analogizing to common law principles of chattel governing
questions of title, the defendant argued that title should be
presumed as the copyrighted work had entered the stream of
commerce. The Fifth Circuit reversed the lower court.162 If
EFF had been around in 1978, it might have sounded a
similar alarm at the Fifth Circuit’s decision in American
International Pictures.
Similarly to Timothy Vernor, a
merchant trading on eBay, AIP II’s decision and rationale
could have been argued to have a chilling effect on secondary
markets.
The Fifth Circuit cited dicta from Platt that “an
unwitting purchaser who buys a copy in the secondary
market can be held liable for infringement if the copy was not
the subject of a first sale by the copyright holder.”163 As
discussed supra, Platt articulated the principle that the
federal right of copyright may support differential treatment
for copyrighted works when in conflict with state derived
common law rights. In holding for the film print reseller, the
district court in AIP I had relied on the common law
principles of property that possession is a rebuttable
presumption and serves the public good by supporting the
“free circulation of goods in commerce.”164 These principles
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are consistent with the utilitarian theory associated with
“traditional incentives” model, which favors secondary
markets and greater access and availability of creative works.
The Fifth Circuit, however, expressly criticized and
rejected the lower court’s reasoning finding it inapplicable to
a case involving intellectual property.165 The Fifth Circuit,
consistent with a natural rights justification, argued that
copyright law bestowed strong rights in the copyright holder:
Here the plaintiffs’ evidence established a course of
conduct, unrebutted as to the specific films in the
complaint, consistent with an intention to retain all the
rights associated with the grant of copyright to the films
in question. We have located no copyright case holding
that possession of a copy by a third person overcomes the
rights of the copyright holder in such circumstances.
Rather, because copyright law favors the rights of the
copyright holder, the person claiming authority to copy
or vend generally must show that his authority to do so
flows from the copyright holder.166

“Course of conduct” referred to the film producers’
practice of executing agreements with parties who received
copies of film prints, stating that no transfer of title in the
film print had been granted.167 The court went on to clearly
state that a copyright holder can avoid the trigger of first sale
doctrine through such a course of conduct:

04/16/2012 17:10:32

165. See AIP II, 576 F.2d at 664–65.
166. Id. at 665. (emphasis added). The Fifth Circuit does not cite BobbsMerrill. This Article argues that the Fifth Circuit’s decision in AIP II is in
direct conflict with Bobbs-Merrill. See infra Part III.B.
167. See id.
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The [film producer]’s evidence, although flawed by its
generality and gaps in the personal knowledge of the
corporate witnesses, demonstrated that the [film
producer] had consistently attempted to retain title
(emphasis added) to the films involved in the complaint.
[The film print reseller]’s evidence, suggesting that first
sales of other films had been made, demonstrated only
that [copyright holder] had not treated all films
consistently. [The film print reseller]’s general evidence,
unrelated to any film in the complaint, thus left
unrebutted the [film producer]’s proof that, whatever their
treatment of other films, they had consistently avoided
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first sales of the films in this suit.168

04/16/2012 17:10:32

168. Id. at 665–66.
169. See id. at 664–65.
170. See Am. Int’l Pictures, Inc. v. Foreman (AIP I), 400 F. Supp. 928, 934
(S.D. Ala. 1975).
171. See id. at 932.
172. See AIP II, 576 F.2d at 665–66.
173. See id. at 665.
174. Tennessee Fabricating Co. v. Moultrie Mfg. Co., 421 F.2d 279 (5th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 928 (1970).
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The Fifth Circuit reversed the lower court, and debunked
the idea that presumption of possession was lawful.169 The
district court judge was persuaded by defendant’s testimony
that many of the agreements that film producers used seemed
more like a sale than a lease.170 In one case with United
Artists Corporation (“UA”), UA had distributed motion
picture prints as “life-of-print” leases but the court found that
the terms of the transaction, single lump sum payment and
no obligation to return the print seemed more like a sale.171
The Fifth Circuit, however, was not persuaded. They found
that defendant could not trace the particular film prints at
issue to a legal document evidencing a sale.172
The key terms for the Fifth Circuit were “intent” and
“course of conduct.” The Fifth Circuit did not expressly name
a new doctrine in copyright law; however, the reasoning of the
Fifth Circuit decision supports a copyright doctrine of
inherent rights of the copyright holder. To determine intent
the court fashioned a standard, the “course of conduct,” to
determine if the copyright holder demonstrated its
manifested intent to retain title in its copyrighted works. The
Fifth Circuit cited several authorities for general principles
that support a copyright doctrine of “inherent rights.” They
included control by the copyright holder in the retention of
rights, deference to the copyright holders’ intent regarding
any transfer of those rights, and even preferences granted to
ownership rights of copyright holders in the objects or
products containing that copyright compared to owners of
general chattel.173
For the principle of the control of the rights associated
with copyright ownership, the Fifth Circuit cited another
Fifth Circuit decision, Tennessee Fabricating Co. v. Moultrie
Manufacturing Co.,174 claiming that “the copyright certificate
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175. AIP II, 576 F.2d at 665.
176. Id.
177. See, e.g., Von Tilzer v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., Inc., 53 F. Supp. 191
(D.C.N.Y. 1943), aff’d, 158 F.2d 516 (2d Cir. 1946); Edward B. Marks Music
Corp. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 47 F. Supp. 490 (D.C.N.Y. 1942), aff’d, 140 F.2d
266 (2d Cir. 1944), modified, 140 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1944); Schellberg v.
Empringham, 36 F.2d 991 (D.C.N.Y. 1929).
178. See AIP II, 576 F.2d at 665.
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is prima facie evidence that the copyright holder retains all
Deference to the
rights granted by the copyright.”175
copyright holder was stated by the Fifth Circuit in its
statement that “copyright law favors the rights of the
copyright holder, the person claiming authority to copy or
vend generally must show that his authority to do so flows
from the copyright holder.”176 It cited several district court
decisions in the Second Circuit.177 The court summed up this
principle with the statement that: “[n]one of these cases
suggests that mere possession of a copy is sufficient to meet
this burden.”178
Applying the “inherent rights” doctrine and the
corresponding “course of conduct” standard derived from the
reasoning of AIP II, the issue is framed as a copyright one:
has there been a voluntary transfer of title such that the one
in possession of a copy of the work should be treated as an
owner for purposes of the first sale doctrine. If the content
producer has established a course of conduct of consistently
licensing the software copies, and expressly retaining its title
in such copies, then its licensee is a “rightful possessor” of
such copyrightable copy, but first sale doctrine is not
triggered. Where a course of conduct is established then the
burden is on the possessor to show that the copyright holder
did transfer title in a first sale such that the copyholder’s
exclusive right to distribute became subject to the first sale
doctrine.
The divergent outcomes between the lower court and the
Fifth Circuit reflect the competing copyright theories at work.
The lower court had followed the traditional utilitarian
theory of copyright that deadweight losses from monopoly
copyright are offset by traditional doctrines such as first sale
that promote greater accessibility and availability of
copyrighted works. The Fifth Circuit, influenced by the
Second Circuit in Platt, followed the competing natural rights
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justification for copyright, and felt little concern about
circumscribing the effect of the first sale doctrine. The
language of AIP II such as emphasis on need to show
“voluntary transfer” of title clearly supports a theory of strong
property rights vested in the copyright holder. As discussed
supra, the “natural rights” influence on the “inherent rights”
doctrine has historical roots in the early development of
copyright in the U.S.179
C. Application of the “Inherent Rights” Copyright Doctrine to
Software: ISC-Bunker and Harmony

04/16/2012 17:10:32

179. See Ginsburg, supra note 20, at 1023; see supra Part I.A.
180. See ISC-Bunker Ramo Corp. v. Altech, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 1310, 1314
(N.D. Ill. 1990); Microsoft Corp. v. Harmony Computers & Elecs., Inc., 846 F.
Supp. 208, 212, 212–13 (E.D.N.Y. 1994).
181. See ISC-Bunker, 765 F. Supp. at 1314.
182. Id.
183. See Harmony, 846 F. Supp. at 210.
184. See ISC-Bunker, 765 F. Supp. at 1331 (emphasis added).
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ISC-Bunker and Harmony were two software decisions
involving first sale doctrine that looked to the progenitor
American International Pictures for guidance on the question
of whether the “possessor” of the software had the benefit of
the first sale doctrine in a claim by the copyright holder for
infringement.180
ISC-Bunker involved a company, ISCBunker Ramo Corp. (“ISC”), who serviced computers and sold
used computers.181 Part of ISC’s business model was not only
to sell computer systems, which included a license to the
software contained therein, but also provide maintenance and
support to its customers. It sued its competitor, Altech,
arguing that Altech had infringed its copyright in the
software contained in the computer systems.182 In the other
case, Microsoft sued Harmony, a software reseller, for
committing copyright infringement by the unauthorized
unbundling and reselling its software.183
Citing American International Pictures, ISC-Bunker
found that “Altech had no authority to possess ISC’s
software.”184 The court reasoned that any such authority
must come from ISC, who, as the copyright holder, has the
exclusive right to control distribution of its software. The
court found that “ISC, through its licensing agreements,
has specifically limited distribution to licensed customers
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185. Id. (emphasis added).
186. Id. (emphasis added).
187. Platt & Monk Co. v. Republic Graphics, Inc., 315 F.2d 847, 852 (2d Cir.
1963) (emphasis added).
188. See Harmony, 846 F. Supp. at 210.
189. Id.
190. See id. at 213.
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only, and proscribed any further distribution of its
software.”185 Finally, the court concluded that “Altech has no
lawful right to possess ISC software, and has acquired no
title (emphasis added) to or other rights in that software.”186
ISC-Bunker’s statement of the authority of the copyright
holder to determine the transfer of title harkened back to
Platt’s statement that the “absence of the author’s authority
to sell is a defect of title.”187 This is also consistent with the
natural rights theory of copyright. Authority is derived solely
from the intention of the copyright holder. The court’s
reference to ISC’s conduct “through its licensing agreements”
was similar to AIP II’s description of the film publishers’
behavior as a “course of conduct” demonstrating its intent to
retain rights of ownership in a copyrighted article while
making such article available to the public. That standard
“course of conduct” as enunciated by AIP II was followed in
ISC-Bunker with its analysis of the copyright holders’ general
practices in its licensing agreements of retaining rights of
title in the copyrighted material. ISC-Bunker applied a
copyright “inherent rights” doctrine based on principles of
manifested intent of the copyright holder rather than contract
principles that would analyze the mutual intention of the
parties.
Harmony considered whether the first sale doctrine
shielded a reseller of software products from a claim of
copyright infringement by the software producer/copyright
holder, Microsoft.188 This reseller had not entered into an
agreement directly with Microsoft but had purchased the
products from another reseller, then resold those products in
violation of the licensing restrictions.189 After stating the first
sale doctrine, the court applied the standard from AIP II,
word for word, referring directly to the AIP II language of
“chain of title” and “course of conduct.”190
Harmony found that a copyright holder may license its
rights and still retain the title such that first sale doctrine is
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not triggered:
Defendant’s failure to trace their Microsoft Products to a
“first sale” by the copyright holder is aggravated by the
fact that plaintiff has “established a course of conduct
. . . consistent with an intention to retain all the rights
associated with the grant of copyright” of the Microsoft
Products.191

Id. (emphasis added).
See id. at 210.
Id. at 213.
Id.

04/16/2012 17:10:32

191.
192.
193.
194.
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Just like in AIP II, there was no discussion in Harmony
of contract principles of mutual assent of the parties, but only
a copyright analysis of the demonstrated intent by the
copyright holder to retain its rights of ownership in the
copyrighted article. Ultimately the Fifth Circuit in AIP II, as
the Eastern District Court of New York did later in Harmony,
concluded that the copyright holder had retained its rights of
ownership and not transferred title such that first sale
doctrine would apply.
In Harmony the reseller claimed that the first sale
doctrine applied because he had acquired the software
The court in
through a valid licensing agreement.192
Harmony cited ISC-Bunker, rejecting that rationale:
“Entering a license agreement is not a ‘sale’ for purposes of
the first sale doctrine.”193
ISC-Bunker, as discussed supra, built on AIP II’s
copyright rationale of inherent rights.
The court
distinguished a (rightful) possession of a copyrighted article,
without title to the article because the copyright holder chose
to retain the title, from one who has received an authorized
transfer of title from the copyright holder. Harmony made
this distinction even clearer when it stated that “the only
chain of distribution that Microsoft authorizes is one in which
all possessors of Microsoft Products have only a license to use,
The
rather than actual ownership of the Products.”194
rationale in both of these decisions is consistent with natural
rights theory of copyright.
In Harmony, the “possessor” of the software, was a
reseller who did not intend to install or use the software and
had not entered into a reseller agreement with the software
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producer/copyright holder, Microsoft. This did not matter to
the court because it followed AIP III’s copyright doctrine of
“inherent rights” of ownership. A copyright holder’s rights
cannot be abridged by a third party even an innocent third
party. Harmony stated:
A licensee who has failed to satisfy a condition of the
license or has materially breached the licensing contract
has no rights to give a sublicensee under which the
sublicensee can take cover in a copyright infringement
case, and therefore, both the licensee and the sublicensee
can be held liable for acting without authorization and
thereby infringing the licensor’s copyright.195

Id. at 214.
Id.
Id.
Platt & Monk Co. v. Republic Graphics, Inc., 315 F.2d 847, 852 (2d Cir.

04/16/2012 17:10:32

195.
196.
197.
198.
1963).
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Finally, the court addressed the question of whether the
software producer had a claim of copyright infringement or
breach of contract. The court noted that in this case it was
clearly copyright infringement because there was no privity
between the parties.196 It noted, however, that even if there
had been a distribution agreement between the parties the
copyright holder/software producer could have still brought a
copyright infringement claim for exceeding the scope of the
copyright license.197 Harmony recognized the lack of privity
in the reseller fact pattern, something that the later prosoftware decisions failed to do.
Harmony expressly followed AIP II’s inherent rights
doctrine of copyright ownership. The copyright holder may
expressly retain title in its distribution of the product. The
spirit of Platt lived on through AIP II, then in the digital age,
in the opinions of ISC-Bunker and Harmony. Platt had
emphasized that an “absence of the author’s authority to sell
is a defect of title.”198 Harmony interpreted this to mean that
where the copyright holder expressly retains title, no transfer
has occurred, and there is no first sale.
The “inherent rights” rationale based on natural rights
theory runs through ISC-Bunker and Harmony.
It is
predicated on the assumption that the copyright holders, in
these cases software producers, rather than toy producers or
film producers, needed greater protection as a reward for
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their contribution to societal welfare. The rationales and
outcomes of these decisions are aligned in a purely natural
rights theory of copyright, but they are also consistent with
the “property rights” paradigm.
The “inherent rights”
rationale forms the natural rights branch of the hybrid
“property rights” paradigm that includes the utilitarian
strand of economic theory inspired by the work of Harold
Demsetz.
Next, the Article turns to the district court decisions in
One Stop and Stargate, then the Ninth Circuit decision in
Vernor II. All of these decisions reached a pro-software
outcome; however, the analytical break from AIP II’s coherent
copyright analysis, and the attempt to inject contract
principles into the rationale of the decision, diminished the
justificatory force of these decisions. Their rationales and
outcomes are misaligned; the jurisprudential foundation of
the “property rights” paradigm provides coherency to their
outcomes finding in favor of the content (software) producer.
D. Analytical Break – Conflating Contract with Copyright
Analysis: One Stop and Stargate

04/16/2012 17:10:32

199. See Adobe Sys. Inc. v. One Stop Micro, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1089
(N.D. Cal. 2000).
200. See id. at 1090.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 1089.
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In One Stop, Adobe brought a copyright action and the
Northern District Court of California began its analysis citing
the copyright doctrine of first sale.199 Then, it quickly shifted
to an analysis that resembled a contract theory approach. By
framing the question as whether the transaction at issue
constituted a sale or a license, the court began a lengthy
investigation and analysis of the contract at issue and the
circumstances surrounding the particular transaction.200 The
statement that “the Court must give effect to the mutual
intention of the parties” (emphasis added) most
transparently revealed the contract theory approach
employed by the court.201 One Stop’s opinion set up this
discussion with the section sub-heading: “OCRA—sale or
license;” OCRA an acronym for the title of the agreement that
Adobe used to document the transaction.202 After a few
sentences referring to the relevant copyright statute and a
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203. Id. at 1090.
204. See id. at 1092.
205. See Adobe Sys. Inc. v. Stargate Software Inc., 216 F. Supp. 2d 1051,
1052–53 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
206. See id. at 1055–56.
207. Id. at 1057.
208. Id. (citing One Stop, 84 F. Supp. at 1091).
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few prior decisions on the copyright doctrine, the court then
devoted several pages to detailed references to the language
of the agreement and testimony from the parties related to
the commercial practices of the parties. It went on to state,
“The parties’ intent is inferred exclusively from the language
of the contract, assuming the language is ‘clear and
explicit.’ ” 203 The court found that the transaction was a
license and first sale doctrine did not apply.204
Two years after One Stop, Adobe brought a copyright
infringement suit against another reseller, Stargate, under
similar circumstances again in the Northern District Court of
California.205 Similar to One Stop, the court zigzagged in
method from copyright analysis to contract analysis. After a
brief introduction to first sale doctrine, it quickly turned to an
examination of the agreement at issue to determine if there
had been a sale, triggering the first sale doctrine.206 The
court found it important that the agreement imposed
numerous restrictions on title, citing the restriction that
resellers distribute pursuant to the terms of a EULA.207
There was less testimony from various parties on software
licensing practices as in One Stop, but the court quoted from
One Stop that “these numerous restrictions imposed by Adobe
indicate a license rather than a sale because they undeniably
interfere with reseller’s ability to further distribute the
software.”208 This rationale can not be grounded in contract
theory because of the absence of vertical privity. “Inherent
rights” doctrine, grounded in natural rights theory, offers a
cogent rationale for the district court’s outcome. It supports
the unilateral right of the copyright holder to place limits on
the distribution of its copyrighted works.
In Stargate, the reseller raised the “economic realities”
argument, lifted directly from the opinion of Softman, the
intervening decision between One Stop and Stargate, from the
Central District of California, that had ruled against
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209. See SoftMan Prods. Co. v. Adobe Sys. Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1084
(C.D. Cal. 2001).
210. See Stargate, 216 F. Supp. 2d at 1055.
211. Id. at 1056.
212. Id. at 1059. Judge Ware quoted directly from the Ohio Supreme Court’s
opinion, when it stated that “[t]he right to contract freely with the expectation
that the contract shall endure according to its terms is as fundamental to the
society as the right to write and to speak without restraint.” Blount v. Smith,
12 Ohio St. 2d 41, 47 (1967).
213. See Adobe Sys. Inc. v. One Stop Micro, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1090
(N.D. Cal. 2000).
214. See ProCD v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1454 (7th Cir. 1996); Bowers v.
Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
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Instead of relying on copyright analysis the
Adobe.209
Northern District of California responded in kind arguing
that the transaction at issue, repeating the phrase “economic
realities” of the transaction, favored its finding that by the
terms of the license agreement at issue there was no sale and
thus no triggering of first sale.210
The court’s statements that “Adobe has elected (emphasis
added) to distribute its products via license rather than sale,”
as well as statement that “Adobe characterizes each
transaction it concluded through the entire stream of
commerce (emphasis added) relevant,” hinted at something
different than a contract theory approach but were
undeveloped.211 This could have been developed more fully to
support of a copyright theory approach based on the “inherent
rights” doctrine enunciated by AIP II, and followed by
Harmony and ISC-Bunker.
Falling back to contract
principles, Stargate wrapped up its opinion by opining on the
importance to society of the “right to contract freely.”212 Here
the court harkened back to its earlier opinion in One Stop
when it stated the importance of “giving effect to the mutual
intention of the parties.”213 This also echoed the faulty
reasoning of ProCD and Bowers claiming that the effect of
their decision was really limited because of an imagined
version of privity.214
One Stop and Stargate represent the fragile link to the
earlier first sale decisions of AIP II, Harmony, and ISCBunker, that unabashedly applied a copyright doctrine of
“inherent rights” consistent with a “property rights”
justification for copyright law. They also represent the
analytical break where the court applied flawed contract
reasoning instead of relying expressly on the “property rights”
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theory that offers justificatory force to its outcome. This
misdirection becomes more apparent in the Ninth Circuit’s
Vernor II decision, which made no explicit reference to those
earlier pro-copyright holder decisions.
E. Alternative Rationale for Vernor v. Autodesk (Vernor II)

04/16/2012 17:10:32

215. See Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc. (Vernor II), 621 F.3d 1102, 1116 (9th Cir.
2010).
216. See Vernor II, 621 F.3d at 1110–11.
217. See id. at 1111.
218. Id. The doctrine enunciated by Wise was as opaque as the murky fact
situation in the case.
219. See Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc. (Vernor I), 555 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1170
(W.D. Wash. 2008).
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On September 10, 2010, the Ninth Circuit reversed the
decision of the District Court of the Western District of
Washington, and found that the licensing agreement used by
Autodesk prevented Timothy Vernor from benefiting from the
first sale doctrine.215 Timothy Vernor, who had purchased an
authentic copy of Autodesk software from a third party, had
attempted to resell such software on eBay. The license
agreement attached to the software restricted its use to the
initial purchaser and prohibited further transfer without
Autodesk’s express permission. Timothy Vernor had claimed
that the first sale doctrine shielded his sale of the software
from an action of copyright infringement. The lower court
had found in favor of Timothy Vernor.
In its analysis, the Ninth Circuit carried out a strained
examination of its own precedent, United States v. Wise,216 a
criminal prosecution case, and the MAI trio, § 117 cases.217
United States v. Wise was a Ninth Circuit decision from the
late 1970’s involving criminal prosecution of distribution of
film prints. In that decision, the court found that in the case
of certain film prints (not all, or even a majority) the
Government had failed to meet its burden of proof that there
was an absence of first sale, such that the defendant would be
guilty of copyright infringement. In those instances the court
found a number of factors important to its decision including
the factor of indefinite possession.218 The lower court in
Vernor I found that factor critical to the outcome of the
decision.219
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220. See Vernor II, 621 F.3d at 1110–11.
221. Id. at 1111, 1113.
222. Id. at 1111.
223. Wall Data Inc. v. Los Angeles Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 447 F.3d 769, 785
(9th Cir. 2006); Triad Sys. Corp. v. Se. Express Co., 64 F.3d 1330, 1333 (9th Cir.
1995); MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, 991 F.2d 511, 511 (9th Cir. 1993).
[hereinafter, collectively, the MAI trio].
224. See MAI, 991 F.2d at 519 n.5. The Ninth Circuit stated in this often
quoted footnote, “[s]ince MAI licensed its software, the Peak customers do not
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The Ninth Circuit considered the District Court’s decision
to rely on Wise but found that the two decisions were not in
direct conflict, arguing that the earlier decision, Wise, stated
several factors to consider, none of which were dispositive.220
The Ninth Circuit finally arrived at its holding by examining
the specific license agreement in question and finding specific
conditions that supported its multi-factor test finding that
licensee was not an owner for purposes of first sale.221
Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit found that its holding was
consistent with its construction of both the MAI trio and
Wise.222
Examining the specific license agreement would indicate
a contract theory approach similar to that employed in One
Stop and Stargate. The Ninth Circuit appeared to really refashion Wise by developing the three factor test to determine
whether the transaction was a license or a sale. All the
factors, including label of license, restrictions on transfer and
notable use restrictions, required an examination of the
language of the specific license agreement. This approach
suffered from the same analytical error as One Stop and
Stargate as it required the illogical leap to hold a party, the
reseller, not in privity to the software producer/copyright
holder bound to an agreement under a contract theory. In
copyright, any user of a copyrighted article, whether or not in
privity with the rights holder, can be held liable for
infringement of the rights of the copyright holder.
In MAI trio,223 there were three decisions by the Ninth
Circuit that construed § 117 and involved the question of
whether the defendant could be considered an “owner” for
purposes of benefiting from § 117’s safe harbor from copyright
infringement. Starting with MAI v. Peak’s famous footnote
stating that where software is licensed, the users cannot
qualify as owners, the other decisions followed suit in their
construction of § 117.224 In Vernor I, the lower court did not
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challenge that interpretation even for a parallel application of
a § 117 construction to a § 109 (first sale) fact pattern and
decision. In fact Vernor I stated that if it followed MAI trio
decisions it would find in favor of Autodesk.225 The lower
court had found that these decisions were irreconcilably in
conflict and chose to rely on Wise, for the putative reason that
it followed Ninth Circuit precedent of choosing the earlier
decision in conflicting decisions.226
The Ninth Circuit in Vernor II reached a pro-software
producer outcome consistent with its heritage of pro-content
producer decisions but without arguably a satisfactory
rationale for that result as suggested by commentators.227
The analytical break from AIP II’s rationale began with One
Stop but was complete with the Vernor II’s decision. The
Ninth Circuit seemed to be completely unaware of earlier
precedent in the area of first sale doctrine, beginning with
American International Pictures and Platt, and continuing
through Harmony and ISC-Bunker.228 One Stop cited ISCBunker, quoted from Harmony, but failed to fully appreciate
and follow their copyright theory approach. One is left
understanding Vernor II either based on (a) the thin reed of
statutory construction of MAI Trio of the related § 117
doctrine; or (b) a re-fashioned construction of Wise based on a
weak contract theory that the parties intended to restrict title
in this particular transaction.
31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 37 Side A
04/16/2012 17:10:32

qualify as ‘owners’ of the software and are not eligible for protection under
Section 117.” Professor Carver argued that “the entire framing of the question
as one of ‘license versus sale’ presents a false dichotomy that should be
avoided.” See Carver, supra note 12 at 1934.
225. See Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc. (Vernor I), 555 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1172
(W.D. Wash. 2008).
226. See id.
227. See Carver, supra note 12, at 1900.
228. Cf. The Ninth Circuit referred briefly to two Supreme Court decisions
involving first sale doctrine. Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc. (Vernor II), 621 F.3d
1102, 1107 (9th Cir. 2010). In dicta in Quality King, the Court referred to
Section 109 (d), which lists exceptions to the Section 109 first sale rule, such as
bailee and lessee. Quality King Distrib., Inc. v. L’Anza Research Int’l Inc., 523
U.S. 135, 147 (1998). Surprisingly the Court added in its opinion, “licensee,”
although that term or category does not exist in the actual statute. Id. The
Ninth Circuit also discussed Bobbs-Merrill for its reference to a lack of a
contract or licensing agreement between the parties. Vernor II, 621 F.3d at
1107. As discussed infra, the Ninth Circuit looked narrowly at the language of
Bobbs-Merrill, missing its reference to a lack of privity between the parties.
Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Strauss, 210 U.S. 339, 339 (1908).
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Like the District Court of Northern California in One
Stop and Stargate, the Ninth Circuit did evidence some spirit
of AIP II by describing Autodesk’s global licensing practice
and policy in its opinion. Vernor II described Autodesk’s
licensing practices as one where it reserves title to the
software copies.229 Discussing in more detail the practices,
the Ninth Circuit stated:
Since at least 1986, Autodesk has offered AutoCAD to
customers pursuant to an accompanying software license
agreement (“SLA”) . . . The SLA . . . first recites that
Autodesk retains title to all copies . . . . [I]t imposes
transfer restrictions, prohibiting customers from renting,
leasing, or transferring the software without Autodesk’s
prior consent . . . .230

04/16/2012 17:10:32

229. Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc. (Vernor II), 621 F.3d 1102, 1103 (9th Cir. 2010).
230. Id. at 1104.
231. Id.
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The Ninth Circuit also noted that “Autodesk takes
measures to enforce these license requirements.”231 All of the
above can be coherently rationalized by the “inherent rights”
doctrine of copyright ownership, and the natural rights
branch of the “property rights” paradigm of copyright. The
copyright holders had established a “course of conduct”
consistent with an intention to retain all the rights associated
with the grant of copyright to the material at issue. Arguably
the multi-factor test developed by the Ninth Circuit test that
in Vernor II was really a restatement of AIP’s “course of
conduct” standard.
Neither of the factors that the district court in Vernor I
believed to be dispositive appeared in the final test that the
Ninth Circuit fashioned for analyzing the question of whether
the transaction should be treated as a sale or a license. The
Ninth Circuit all but ignored the importance of factors of
“indefinite possession” or “full price” discussed in Wise. In
essence the surface doctrinal language of the opinion
respected the precedent of Wise but not the outcome. Those
factors speak to the limits on control by the copyright holders’
right to control distribution of its creative works, and inform
the “rightful possessor” theory advanced by the express
reasoning of Softman. The “rightful possessor” rationale
coherently fits with the “traditional incentives” theory of
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copyright.232 On the other hand, the test fashioned by Vernor
II, echoed its unclaimed heritage, namely an emphasis on the
copyright holder’s power to unilaterally place reservations on
title, effectively avoiding the first sale doctrine. All of the
pro-software producer decisions are consistent with the
“property rights” based theory of copyright that relies on a
natural rights justification, and believes that markets and
private ordering are the best (if not exclusive) mechanism for
production and allocation of creative works for the optimal
societal welfare.
III. TRADITIONAL INCENTIVES THEORY AND THE PRINCIPLES
OF BOBBS-MERRILL

04/16/2012 17:10:32

232. See infra notes 246–70 and accompanying text.
233. See Steven Seidenberg, Court Ruling May Give Copyright Owners More
COUNSEL
(Dec.
2010),
available
at
Restricting
Rights,
INSIDE
http://www.insidecounsel.com/Issues/2010/December-2010/Pages/Court-RulingMay-Give-Copyright-Owners-Restricting-Rights.aspx?page=1 (“What this ruling
[Vernor v. Autodesk decision] means to software companies is that they can
continue business as usual,” says Suzanne Bell, a partner at Wilson Sonsini
Goodrich & Rosati, quoted in this Article.).
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Part II argued that the pro-software decisions suffered
from analytical error of confusing contract with copyright
analysis. Going a step further it also argued that the recent
pro-software decisions, One Stop, Stargate, and Vernor II,
could best be reconciled with their predecessor software
decisions of Harmony and ISC-Bunker, as well as the predigital pro-content producer decision of AIP II, and the
doctrinal tenets of Platt, by rationalizing them with the
“property rights” theory of intellectual property.
At this point the reader may wonder why go further,
what is there left to say. Software producers were happy with
the outcome of Vernor II.233 The state of digital commerce,
however, is at a critical inflection point where the debate and
discussion about the values that society expects to be
promoted and upheld by copyright law demands more
scrutiny and public debate.
As the title to Professor
Rothchild’s article portends, the first sale doctrine is indeed
“an incredible shrinking rule,” as the current trend of digital
commerce is to shrink if not to eliminate any vestige of the
first sale rule. Book retailers, such as Amazon and Barnes &
Noble, who distribute the popular e-book readers, Kindle and
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Nook, are accomplishing in the marketplace what BobbsMerrill renounced at the turn of the last century. Consumers
who purchase the reader can download full texts of a book
and keep the book “indefinitely” but they are prevented from
fully exercising the traditional rights of first sale, namely to
transfer or otherwise dispose of that copy of the book at their
pleasure. The Kindle, in books, and the iPod, in music,
illustrate the emergence of tethered devices where the
consumer can only access the content through proprietary
interfaces controlled by the content producer.
Although currently the minority view, the “traditional
incentives” theory of intellectual property forms the best fit,
in my opinion, with the principles of the progenitor first sale
decision, Bobbs-Merrill, as well as the plain language of the
constitutional mandate for the intellectual property regime.
Part III begins with an examination of the principles
enunciated by Bobbs-Merrill and analyzes how those
principles should animate the analysis and construction of
the first sale doctrine. To understand the divergence in the
current debate, it is helpful to apply the Bobbs-Merrill
analysis to the historical decisions of Platt and AIP II. As
argued supra, Platt can be read to find a narrower
construction of its opinion then adherents of the “property
rights” theory may be inclined; however AIP II’s analysis
cannot be harmonized with Bobbs-Merrill and represents the
harbinger of the “property” approach to the first sale doctrine
as held by the current majority view. Then, the discussion
turns to the “minority” view decisions of AIP I, Softman, and
Vernor I, and how they can be understood in the context of
the principles of Bobbs-Merrill. Although the fact patterns
and outcomes of these minority decisions are consistent with
Bobbs-Merrill, they failed to rationalize their decisions with
the principles and analysis of Bobbs-Merrill.
Finally, the Article proposes a model of “constructive
ownership” building on the “rightful possessor” theory of
ownership but adding a third prong for the special case of
software. This model if adopted by the courts would limit
Vernor II to its facts applying to most cases of software
(assuming it met the conditions of the model) but not to other
digital media. It is the contention of this Article that this
“constructive ownership” model more faithfully fulfills the
promises of Bobbs-Merrill and the original intention of the
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constitutional mandate for the intellectual property regime.
A. Bobbs-Merrill Doctrine on First Sale
The first sale doctrine was first promulgated in the
Supreme Court decision, Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus in
1908.234 The Court held that the exclusive right to “vend”
under the copyright statute applied only to the first sale of
the copyrighted work.235 In that case the publisher, BobbsMerrill, had attempted to control the re-sale price of a
particular book, “The Castaway,” by inserting in the inside
cover of the book a notice stating that it was a violation of its
copyright to sell such copy of the book for less than one
dollar.236 The retailer, Macy’s, attempted to do so and was
sued by the publisher for copyright infringement.237
Bobbs-Merrill, the publisher and copyright owner, had
argued that its exclusive right to vend (distribute) included
the right to determine how much of that right it parted with
and how much it retained to itself.238 The Court responded by
framing the question in a way that transparently revealed
the Court’s concern about the effect of the copyright holder’s
intent to unilaterally determine the scope and meaning of the
right to vend. To the question of what does the statute mean
in granting the right to vend, the Court responded:

To that rhetorical question, the Court answered in the
negative.240 The similarity between the pointed references by
the Court to the salient characteristics of that case and those
of the current software cases in the Ninth Circuit is striking.
In 1908, the Court referred to (a) a notice affixed to the
See Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Strauss, 210 U.S. 339, 339 (1908).
See id. at 350–51.
Id. at 341.
Id. at 341–42.
Id. at 349–50.
Id. (emphasis added).
See id. at 350.
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234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
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Was it intended to create a right which would permit the
holder of the copyright to fasten, by notice in a book or
upon one of the articles mentioned within the statute, a
restriction upon the subsequent alienation of the
subject-matter of copyright after the owner had parted
with the title to one who had acquired full dominion over
it and had given a satisfactory price for it?239
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241. Id. at 350–51.
242. See The Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 109(b)(1)(A) (2008).
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copyright article; (b) one who had acquired “full dominion”
over the article, and (c) one had paid a “satisfactory price” for
the article.241 In 2010, Vernor II considered a case where the
reseller Timothy Vernor had purchased a copy of software
with a EULA attached to it, and there were no further
obligations of payment or return.
Similar parallel
construction can be drawn with pro-software decisions, One
Stop and Stargate, as well decisions, Softman and Vernor I,
finding against the software producer.
Vernor II hurriedly dismissed Bobbs-Merrill with a
reference to the statement that in the Bobbs-Merrill opinion
the case before it did not involve a claim of a contract
limitation or license agreement. However, what Vernor II
failed to notice was that in the next sentence the Court restated its holding but with the particular caveat that between
these parties there was no privity of contract. As discussed
supra, this is the fatal flaw of the reasoning of the prosoftware decisions. Finding privity between Timothy Vernor
and Autodesk, or between the resellers, One Stop and
Stargate, and the software producer, Adobe, is simply
illusory. The only difference between Macy’s, as a retailer, in
1908 and the resellers of current era, is the later adoption of
the UCC and the courts apparent practice of seeing privity
everywhere and nowhere.
As a result of Bobbs-Merrill, consumers can exercise the
right to lend, sell or otherwise dispose of their copies of books,
DVD’s and CD’s. Apart from legislative action restricting the
renting of music and software, consumers can enjoy the
renting of movies.242 Bobbs-Merrill worked under several
theories of intellectual property. It curbed the anticompetitive behavior of copyright producers (then book
publishers) attempting to avoid or control competition in
secondary markets through price discrimination (i.e., keep
used books from being too cheap). It also served to promote
and preserve the delicate balance between producers and
users, promoting availability of creative works. Finally in a
common law theory of property, it affirmed the common law
aversion to restraints on alienation. Bobbs-Merrill articulated and fashioned the first sale doctrine by defining the
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right to vend (now distribute) as something less than an
unlimited, unfettered right. It read into the statutory right
this limitation, namely that the copyright holder exhausts its
right to control vending (distributing) after a transfer of
lawful possession (updated in 1976 Act to use term “first
sale”).
Bobbs-Merrill does not work under the relatively recent
theory of “property rights” discussed supra. In fact the price
discrimination model enshrined by the “property rights”
model runs absolutely contrary to the facts and holding of
Bobbs-Merrill. Also, the reference to “property” values by the
model is misleading as its true focus is its exclusive reliance
on the role of markets and the holy sanctity of “private
ordering” (i.e., contract) to motivate, incentivize and reward
the investors of copyrighted works. This misapprehension,
intentional or not, has continued in the courts by convincing
themselves that under the cover of contract “it’s only a right
among parties.” Is it really a contract, when the boiler plate,
pre-printed document (read: notice), is affixed to a copyrighted work and found binding on a third party reseller?
Where is the distinction from the situation in Bobbs-Merrill
where Macy’s, the retailer, attempted to re-sell the book in
violation of the publisher’s printed notice in the cover of the
book.243 It is the fiction of contract; the principles of “mutual
assent” and “privity” are assumed.

243. See Bobbs-Merrill, 210 U.S. at 350–51.

04/16/2012 17:10:32

In Part II, this Article argued that Platt and AIP II laid
the groundwork for a copyright analysis of inherent rights
grounded in a “property rights” theory of copyright. Arguably
the language in the opinions supported that premise. As
discussed supra, the Second Circuit spoke louder than
necessary for the needs of the case before it. The special
treatment of intellectual property espoused in the opinion
supported the particular holding of the decision. The Second
Circuit compelled the unpaid manufacturer to seek
adjudication of its claim before disposing of the copyrighted
articles. In AIP II, however, there was stronger evidence that
the Fifth Circuit meant to carry the principles of Platt further
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B. Platt and American International Pictures Scrutinized
Under Bobbs-Merrill
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and endow the copyright holder with special rights, rights
arguably stronger than Bobbs-Merrill intended.
Considering the principles espoused in Bobbs-Merrill
particularly the references to alienation, full dominion
and satisfactory price,244 one could infer a preference for
finding as AIP I did. In the absence of evidence of theft or
counterfeiting, the presumption should be that lawful
transfer had occurred. Otherwise, it would seem that a
contrary holding, one similar to AIP II’s doctrine and holding,
would support the contention of the publisher, Bobbs-Merrill,
which the Court derisively referred to as (wrongly) assuming
it had the right to determine how much of that right it parted
with and how much it retained to itself.245 The reseller in AIP
II had no more privity with the film producers than did
Macy’s in the original Bobbs-Merrill decision. Therefore, AIP
II and Bobbs-Merrill are not in harmony.
C. AIP I, Vernor I, and Softman Re-Rationalized Under
Bobbs-Merrill

04/16/2012 17:10:32

244. Id. at 350.
245. See id. at 349–50. The Supreme Court stated “[i]t is the contention of
the appellant that the Circuit Court erred in failing to give effect to the
provision of Section 4952, protecting owners of the copyright in the sole right of
vending the copyrighted book or other article, and the argument is that the
statute vested the whole field of the right of exclusive sale in the copyright
owner; that he can part with it to another to the extent that he sees fit,
and may withhold to himself, by proper reservation, so much of the
rights as he pleases.” Id. (emphasis added).
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Next, this section analyzes the decisions that found
against the content producer/copyright holder decisions, AIP
I, Vernor I, and Softman, in the context of the Bobbs-Merrill
principles. None of these decisions including AIP I closely
followed or expressly relied on Bobbs-Merrill for their
rationale and outcome. These opinions would have been more
persuasive if they had been more closely aligned with the
principles of Bobbs-Merrill, which applied a copyright
analysis supported by a “traditional incentives” theory of
intellectual property. These “minority view” decisions had
fact patterns and outcomes consistent with Bobbs-Merrill.
Bobbs-Merrill can be viewed as standing for four
interdependent principles.
This section compares the
analysis of these opinions to the rubric of the four
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246. See id. at 350–51.
247. Id. at 350.
248. Id. at 349–50.
249. Id.
250. See id. at 350.
251. Id. at 350–51.
252. Am. Int’l Pictures, Inc. v. Foreman (AIP I), 400 F. Supp. 928, 932 (S.D.
Ala. 1975).
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interdependent principles articulated by Bobbs-Merrill. In its
critique of these opinions, this Article also examines all of the
opinions’ implicit or explicit reasoning in support of the
“traditional incentives” theory of intellectual property. The
Court found in favor of the retailer, Macy’s, because all four
had been satisfied.246 First, the Court found that Macy’s
exercised full dominion over the copyrighted article, the novel
“The Castaway.”247 There was no evidence that the publisher
had rented or leased the novel with the obligation to return it
after a finite period of time.248 Second, the Court found that
Macy’s had paid a “satisfactory” price for the article.249 Third,
its decision supported the alienation right generally preferred
in common law; or stated conversely, a decision supporting
the publisher would have constituted a restraint on
alienation, disfavored generally in the common law.250
Finally, the Court found no privity between the parties, which
would have led to an analysis of a binding agreement that
may have altered the above analysis.251 All three decisions
that found against the copyright holder, film producer in AIP
I, software producer in Softman and Vernor I, construed the
first sale doctrine consistent with the principles outlined
above. In most cases, however, the principles have to be
inferred from the factual circumstances and the holdings; the
opinions did not expressly recite in full the Bobbs-Merrill’s
analysis.
In AIP I’s discussion of the life-of-print leases, the court
raised principles one and two without making an explicit
connection to Bobbs-Merrill. Rather than cite or discuss
Bobbs-Merrill, the district court cited another district court
decision, sitting in the Second Circuit, for its exposition of the
first sale doctrine. The court found that the “single lump sum
payment” and the fact that the “[customer] is not obligated to
return [the film print]” left “little doubt but that, in reality,
they are nothing more than sales.”252 AIP I emphasized the
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third principle, the common law’s disfavor for restraints on
alienation, by expressing its support for the principle that
possession is lawful (in absence of contrary evidence).253 Lack
of privity was not discussed in AIP I; neither contract
analysis nor principles were invoked by AIP I or AIP II.
AIP I devoted a great deal of its opinion to discussion of
the policy concerns of a contrary result which would support
the power of the copyright holder to retain title in its
distribution practice. Supporting the view that societal
welfare is optimized by promoting access and availability of
copyrighted articles, AIP I argued that its holding was
“consistent with that policy of law which seeks to provide for
free circulation of goods in commerce.”254 It also supported
limitations on copyright holder’s power when it stated,
“[f]urthermore, this allocation is consistent with the limited
scope of the copyright proprietor’s statutory monopoly which
‘reflects a balance of competing claims upon the public
interest.’ ” 255 AIP I further demonstrated its support for the
“traditional incentives” definition of societal welfare when it
noted that:

AIP I focused more on its reliance on common law
principles of tangible property. AIP I did not make the
analytical error of confusing contract analysis with copyright
analysis; however, it failed to persuasively bring its copyright
analysis under Bobbs-Merrill.
Rather than focus on a
discussion of analogous common law property doctrines, it
could have argued that its rationale and holding were
consistent with Bobbs-Merrill’s principles, namely full
dominion, satisfactory price, alienation and lack of privity.
See id. at 933.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 933–34.
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253.
254.
255.
256.
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Creative work is to be encouraged and rewarded, but
private motivation must ultimately serve the cause of
promoting broad public availability of literature, music
and other arts. The practical and undesirable effects on
“public availability” resulting from a ruling that all those
in the defendant’s position are copyright infringers unless
they can bear the burden of tracing their chain of title
back to a “first sale” by the copyright proprietor are selfevident (internal citations omitted).256
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257. See Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc. (Vernor I), 555 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1170
(W.D. Wash. 2008).
258. Id. at 1168.
259. See Brief for eBay, Inc. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents,
Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102 (2010) (No. 09-35969), at 7–9.
260. See Vernor I, 555 F. Supp. 2d at 1176 (As the court noted, “[a]utodesk
failed to surmount the thorny issues of privity and mutual assent inherent in its
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Vernor I conducted a more strained analysis of precedent
in the Ninth Circuit including Wise and MAI trio. Relying on
Wise, the court found that “the critical factor is whether the
transferee required that the prints be returned” echoing the
first principle of Bobbs-Merrill, exercising “full dominion”
over the article.257 The fact pattern of Vernor I satisfied
principle two of Bobbs-Merrill as there was no further
obligation to pay for the software copy. Vernor I’s reliance on
Wise formed a shaky foundation for several reasons. First, it
could have been distinguished by the procedural posture of
being a criminal prosecution, with a murky factual situation,
and a court hesitant to find liability. Next, Wise did not
clearly articulate a doctrine which is probably why it was not
that difficult for Vernor II to construe a very different reading
of the opinion. The analysis is as opaque as the factual
situation; a great deal of the discussion focused on specific
circumstances of each transaction which would evidence a
contract analysis although it cited copyright doctrine as well.
Vernor I failed to even reference Bobbs-Merrill. In its first
sale doctrine analysis, it referenced the recent Supreme Court
decision Quality King.258
Vernor I did not expressly discuss the policy preference of
an aversion to restraints on alienation; the holding, however,
of Vernor I, finding for first sale, supported the Bobbs-Merrill
principle of alienation. The eBay brief in support of Timothy
Vernor expressed its support for this principle arguing
strongly that a finding of no first sale would have deleterious
effects on secondary markets like its own.259 On the question
of lack of privity, Vernor I expressly raised the lack of privity
and mutual assent as problems for Autodesk’s argument that
the license agreement bound the reseller from attempting to
resell the software. The court pointed to the apparent
anomaly in Autodesk’s contract claim, when it stated,
“[a]utodesk does not explain how a nontransferable license
can bind subsequent transferees.”260
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contention that its License binds Mr. Vernor and his customers, it has ignored
the terms of the License itself . . . . Given the ‘nontransferable’ terms of the
License, and Autodesk’s failure to cite authority for the proposition that the
License binds downstream transferees, the court will not consider the issue
further in this order.”).
261. See id. at 1174.
262. See SoftMan Prods. Co. v. Adobe Sys. Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1086
(C.D. Cal. 2001).
263. See id. at 1087.
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Vernor I expressly disclaimed making policy judgments
in its exercise of a mechanical construction of prior
precedent.261 Its adoption and construction of prior precedent,
however, followed the “traditional incentives” approach. By
construing Wise as finding “indefinite possession” dispositive,
the court adhered to the rationale that (a) some limitation of
copyright holder’s power is necessary for the proper
functioning of copyright law and policy and (b) the promotion
of secondary markets contributes to the societal welfare as
justified by copyright law and policy.
Softman’s opinion most closely expressed the BobbsMerrill principles starting with principles one and two of “full
dominion” and “satisfactory price.” Softman argued that “if a
transaction involves a single payment giving the buyer an
unlimited period in which it has a right of possession, the
transaction is a sale,” and first sale has been triggered.262
Softman did not directly address the question of restraints on
alienation although the factual circumstances and holding fit
well with the Bobbs-Merrill model. Like Macy’s the retailer
of the books, the reseller Softman attempted to resell copies of
software; however, the copyright holder, Adobe attempted to
impose restrictions on the manner in which the articles would
be resold. Adobe’s attempt to enforce a price discrimination
model (educational vs. non-educational uses) was very similar
to Bobbs-Merrill’s attempt to control the price of its
downstream market. Softman’s rejection of Adobe’s position
was consistent with the Bobbs-Merrill decision.
Although Softman did not expressly refer to a “lack of
privity” in its opinion, it addressed rather the question of
assent. The court found no basis for assent by Softman to the
terms of the Adobe license agreement by analyzing the facts
that the reseller did not attempt to install or use the software
product.263 Softman cited Bobbs-Merrill but not quite accurately. Bobbs-Merrill created the doctrine. Softman argued
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264. See id. at 1085.
265. Id. at 1087.
266. Id.
267. SoftMan also relied on the article by David A. Rice entitled “Licensing
the Use of Computer Program Copies and the Copyright Act First Sale
Doctrine.” Professor Rice’s article relied heavily on its reading of Wise, namely
that indefinite possession is dispositive of the first sale question, as well as
analogous principles from tangible property law and UCC principles on the
construction of leases and loan transactions. See Rice, supra note 12, at 173–74.
Wise has now been essentially overruled by Vernor II, and as this Article
argued, it never provided a strong foundation for the broad construction of the
first sale doctrine. Reliance on analogous principles from property law or UCC
was an inferior strategy to relying on the authority that is supreme both in
hierarchy and subject matter, namely the Bobbs-Merrill rationale. See supra
notes 234–43 and accompanying text.
268. See SoftMan, 171 F. Supp. 2d at 1090–91.
269. Id. at 1090.
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in several places in its opinion that the factual circumstances
of the software transaction that included: (a) a single price
and (b) indefinite term of possession, indicated a sale, thus
invoking the first sale doctrine.264 The support for these
statements was not Bobbs-Merrill but several articles and
interestingly ProCD v. Zeidenberg.265 ProCD enforced the
right of the software producer to incorporate price
discrimination into its licensing strategy. Softman’s reliance
on ProCD only makes sense when considering the “Assent”
section where the court in Softman found that in this case,
Softman the reseller, neither installed nor operated the
software so could not have assented to the software producer
restrictions.266 This is where Softman went astray, like One
Stop and Stargate, conflating contract and copyright
analysis.267
Softman expressly demonstrated its support for the
“traditional incentives” theory in its discussion of the “public
interest” test for injunctive relief.268 It was interesting that
the opinion devoted discussion to this topic as the court had
already held that there was no infringement. Nevertheless,
its concern about unchecked power of copyright holders was
expressed with some gravity. First, the opinion noted that
Adobe’s attempt to impose the terms of the EULA
represented an effort to deprive customers of rights they
should enjoy under copyright law and such restrictions were
“inconsistent with the balance of rights set forth in
intellectual property law.”269 In the next paragraph, Softman
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makes several references to the “unlimited” and “unchecked”
power that software producers attempt to exert in the
marketplace.270 Softman clearly supported a “traditional
incentives” theory of intellectual property with the
concomitant belief that limits on copyright holder’s power are
important for the optimal societal welfare. Softman’s
argument would have been strengthened by an explicit
reliance on Bobbs-Merrill.
D. Vernor II Versus Bobbs-Merrill

04/16/2012 17:10:32

270. See id. at 1091 (The court warned that “Adobe seeks a vast and
seemingly unlimited power to control prices and all channels of distribution
. . . . A system of ‘licensing’ which grants software publishers this degree of
unchecked power to control the market deserves to be the object of careful
scrutiny.” (emphasis added)).
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Applying the Bobbs-Merrill principles to Vernor II, it
would at first glance appear that they are in conflict and
cannot be reconciled. Just like AIP II, there was no privity
between the software reseller, Timothy Vernor, and
Autodesk. An outcome for Timothy Vernor would also appear
to satisfy the principles of Bobbs-Merrill. He had indefinite
possession of the article, which would appear to satisfy the
principle of “full dominion.” He also had paid a satisfactory
price and had no further obligation for payments. Finally, an
outcome in his favor would support the common law’s
aversion to restraints against alienation.
The question, however, of whether a software user
exercises “full dominion” may be more complex than in the
case of other copyrighted articles including digital media such
as an e-book, CD or DVD. Quite often, the relationship
between software producer and user is not static but
dynamic. By that I mean that licensing of software often
involves the continuing license of software in the form of
updates and fixes. Conceptually it can be said then that
there is no exhaustion as long as there is a continuing license
of copyrightable material to the user. This point is discussed
below in the next section. For this reason, the proposed
model includes a special exception for software if it satisfies
the condition of a continuing license of copyrighted material
to the user/licensee.
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271. See generally J. H. Reichman, Electronic Information Tools — The Outer
Edge of World Intellectual Property Law, 17 U. DAYTON L. REV. 797 (1992);
Pamela Samuelson et al., A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of
Computer Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2308 (1994) [hereinafter A Manifesto];
Pamela Samuelson, Benson Revisited: The Case Against Patent Protection for
Algorithms and Other Computer Program-Related Inventions, 39 EMORY L.J.
1025, 1148–54 (1990); Pamela Samuelson, CONTU Revisited: The Case Against
Copyright Protection for Computer Programs in Machine-Readable Form, 1984
DUKE L.J. 663, 762–69 (1984).
272. See A Manifesto, supra note 271, at 2318–19.
273. See id. at 2318.

31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 44 Side A

In the case of software, there has been the general
problem, identified by many others, that the legal regime is
ill-suited to appropriately protect (on both ends of the
protection spectrum) the innovation.271 Software is
structurally different from all other forms of creative works
that fall under copyright protection.272 The value of the
program is not in the text or language of the program; it is in
the behavior or function of the program.273 It is what the
program can do for the user that gives it commercial and
utilitarian value.
The problem, both commercial and
conceptual, is that the value of the software that is derived
from genuine creative and innovative effort is vulnerable to
theft by a competitor.
It is helpful to understand the value equation. The same
software code, or text, can be used by a customer in a wide
range of uses, with a corresponding business value.
Depending on the configuration and installation of the
software, the value to the customer, as reflected in the
bargain struck by the producer and customer for the price of
the licensed use, can easily range from $100,000 to multimillion dollars for the same text, the same software code. If a
competitor gained access to the software, it could easily
determine the competitive functional aspects of the software
and unfairly benefit from the innovation of the original
software producer/developer. A competitor may do this
legally or illegally (i.e., violating current copyright norms).
As the software producer knows it will be difficult to detect if
that has occurred, and it will necessarily involve a timeconsuming and costly process to effectively stop the activity
through injunctive relief and/or damages. Under the current
copyright regime, there is no protection for the behavior of the
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See id. at 2308.
Id. at 2412–20.
Id. at 2347–56.
Id. at 2356–61.
Id. at 2413–14.
Id. at 2408.
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274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
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program so the competitor may very well legally obtain the
valuable, competitive aspects of the program. For very
rational reasons, software producers have attempted to
combat that vulnerability by controlling the access, use and
location of their software code. Software producers have
taken measures to restrict the transfer rights of the software
user to prevent access by competitors to the software, a direct
impact on the first sale doctrine of copyright.
In 1994, Professor Pamela Samuelson and three others
published A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of
Computer Programs.274 A Manifesto proposed a “marketoriented legal regime” aimed at protecting against cloning of
program behavior and other industrial design elements of
software.275 Professor Samuelson et al. argued that the
current copyright regime was both over-protective and underprotective. By protecting substantial similarity of the text of
computer software, the more valuable parts of the computer
program, referred to as the behavior of the program, were
often not protected.276 However, the parts of the program that
were protected, namely the “text” or language of the program,
received far greater protection than was necessary to
incentivize innovation and likely led to market destructive
effects.277
A Manifesto recommended a two part solution. The first
part, the anti-cloning protection, would essentially provide
the developer with lead time protection in order to incentivize
its investment in innovation but without causing some of the
market destructive effects of overprotection.278 Although the
article avoided either committing to a judicial or legislative
solution, or a proposed timeframe, it was clear that they
supported something significantly shorter than protection
under current copyright regime, probably three to five
years.279 The article hinted that software developers may be
motivated to lobby Congress for such a legislative solution,
but, in the alternative, they analogized a common law
approach to the unfair competition “hot news” doctrine
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[It] may be easier for Congress to achieve a proper balance
in policy objectives through a sui generis approach to
software protection than could be achieved through use of

Id. at 2423–24.
Id. at 2426.
Id. at 2427–29.
Id. at 2421–22.
Id. at 2421.
See CONG. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY, OTA-TCT-527, FINDING A BALANCE:
COMPUTER SOFTWARE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE CHALLENGE OF
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 26–27 (1992).
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fashioned nearly a century ago by the Supreme Court.280 The
second part of their proposal was a registration system
whereby developers could register those elements of the
program that had benefited from the anti-cloning protection
to some form of licensing scheme.281 Again, the article
avoided a firm commitment on options, but several
possibilities from voluntary to compulsory licensing, including
the hybrid of the current music collectives in the U.S, were
discussed.282
In the evaluation of the three options that the article
proposed between “do nothing” and their full fledged proposal,
it appears that the order of things followed the “do nothing”
option, as far as the development of a special legal regime (or
common law rule) for software.283 A Manifesto anticipated
this possibility by noting that software companies may
believe that they have accomplished what they need in the
regulatory framework with a combination of copyright, patent
and trade secret protection.284 They have also benefited from
the “property rights” theory approach in the evolution of
judicial doctrine of the copyright privileges of first sale, fair
use and the essential copying doctrine. By successfully
convincing the courts that the instrument of the license
agreement (EULA) sanctifies the characterization of the
transaction as one between a licensor/copyright owner and a
licensee/user, rather than “owner” of a copy, software
producers have achieved high level of control over their
intellectual property.
Relying on a 1992 report by the former Congressional
Office of Technology Assessment,285 A Manifesto noted the
dangers of not addressing the specific needs of software by
the legal regime:
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existing legal regimes wherein changes in scope of
protection to accommodate software might distort
principles of protection as applied to other
categories of works.286

This Court notes that software is unique from other
forms of copyrighted information.
Technology and
software, in particular, has radically transformed the way
information is created and exchanged.
Software
fundamentally differs from more traditional forms
of medium, such as print or phonographic materials, in
that software can be both, more readily and easily copied
on a mass scale in an extraordinarily short amount of time

04/16/2012 17:10:32

286. A Manifesto, supra note 271, 2313–14 (emphasis added).
It is
interesting to note that Professor Goldstein wrote favorably about a sui generis
approach to software in both his 1994 and 2003 editions of his book, Copyright’s
Highway. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 20, at 215–16; PAUL GOLDSTEIN,
COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL JUKEBOX, 199
(2003).
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A central tenet of this Article is that the judicial doctrine
has evolved to accommodate software and in the process it
has distorted the important principles of Bobbs-Merrill with
respect to the first sale doctrine. This trend line began with
ProCD and its conflation of privity and assent combined with
strong adherence to the “property rights” theory and economic
model of price discrimination. Bowers continued ProCD
approach adopting the imaginary privity concept.
By ignoring the absence of privity, the courts granted
wide berth to copyright holder’s ability to dictate whether the
copyright law privileges, such as first sale, fair use or
essential copying, existed by decreeing that they do not. In
the case of the first sale doctrine, as has been discussed
supra, the Ninth Circuit has now decreed that a copyright
holder can control the terms of ownership, including the
question of transfer of title. Such limitations on the right of a
purchaser of a copy of software to sell, lend or otherwise
dispose of such copy, as specified by the terms of the EULA
(read: notice) affixed to the product, travels with the product
to whomever may obtain it (lawfully) in the stream of
commerce. Now the pivot.
The special nature of software has moved the courts to
favor the software producers. In Stargate, the court notably
called for “enhanced copyright protection” for software:
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and relatively inexpensively.
One of the primary
advantages of software, its ability to record, concentrate
and convey information with unprecedented ease and
speed, makes it extraordinarily vulnerable to illegal
copying and piracy. This Court finds that it is important
to acknowledge these special characteristics of the
software industry and provide enhanced copyright
protection for its inventors and developers.287

Applying the conceptual framework that where the
software producer continues to license copyrighted material
to the user, exhaustion has not occurred, then it follows that
the software producer may rightfully control the distribution
such that first sale doctrine would not apply. Next, the
article concludes with a brief summary of the “constructive
ownership” model, which incorporates the special case of
software.
F. Proposed Model of “Constructive Ownership”

04/16/2012 17:10:32

287. Adobe Sys. Inc. v. Stargate Software Inc., 216 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1059
(N.D. Cal. 2002) (emphasis added).
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As digital commerce becomes more pervasive in
mainstream culture, society is at an inflection point where
questions of the balance of the protection-access paradigm are
critically important. Current trends with e-readers, such as a
Kindle or Nook, mp3 players, such as the iPod, already have
limited the traditional first sale rights that the public had
enjoyed in the pre-digital world since Bobbs-Merrill. These
digital devices are structured such that the consumer/user
has “indefinite possession” of the works on the device but no
rights of ownership including first sale. The distinction
between possession and ownership requires greater scrutiny
and discussion because of the serious implications for access
and availability of creative works in the digital culture. The
critical factor distinguishing the “traditional incentives”
theory from the “property rights” theory on the first sale
question is that of “possession.” The former view takes
umbrage with the assumption that “indefinite possession” is
not equivalent to a transfer of title and essentially a trigger of
the first sale. Conversely, “property rights” theorists would
not find an analytical problem with “indefinite possession”
and no effective transfer of title.
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288. See Samuelson, supra note 56, at 197.
289. The significant caveat here is that the anti-circumvention provisions of
the Digital Millennium Act of 1998 still provide content producers with a
mechanism to “lock in” content. The narrow application of this model would
imply that courts would not apply Vernor II to the distribution of tangible
DVD’s and CD’s even if the packaging included a EULA similar to that used by
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I propose a new model under a theory of “constructive
ownership” whereby the first sale doctrine is updated for the
digital era. The model builds on the “rightful possessor”
theory embraced by the “minority” view of the courts, but
adds a third prong specifically for the special case of software.
The first two prongs come from those minority decisions and
commentary discussed supra, namely (a) no obligation for
continuing payment or as Bobbs-Merrill stated “a satisfactory
price” and (b) no obligation to return the article or as BobbsMerrill stated “acquired full dominion” over the article. The
third prong would be (c) in the case of computer programs (i.e.
software), no continuing license of copyrighted material by
the copyright holder.
This reflects the special case of
software. Conceptually there is no exhaustion where the
software producer continues to license updates and fixes to
the computer program.
This model of “constructive ownership” would be
consistent with principles of Bobbs-Merrill and the
“traditional incentives” theory that assumes the importance
of balancing protection with access as justified by the
Constitution. As Professor Samuelson wrote over twenty
years ago, the first sale doctrine had been “drafted [in the
statute] more narrowly than its common law roots would
have predicted.”288 The Supreme Court, in its 1908 BobbsMerrill decision, reset the balance between the copyright
holders and the public; the proposal for a “constructive
ownership” approach to the first sale doctrine offers the
possibility of a new millennium recalibration of the first sale
judicial doctrine to fit the digital culture of the 21st century.
The implications of the “constructive ownership” model would
be drawing a line between software distribution (assuming
there is a continuing license of copyright), and the
distribution of digital media, including books, music and
other traditional creative works. The latter would be subject
to the first sale doctrine, allowing the user to freely transfer
their copies.289
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CONCLUSION
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Autodesk in Vernor II. Tackling the effect of the digital locks sanctioned by the
DMCA on the first sale doctrine is another project.
290. See supra notes 59–96 and accompanying text (discussion of
Congressional enactment of § 117 and the courts’ construction of the statute).
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act has largely been considered a legislative
victory for copyright industries. See Robert P. Merges, One Hundred Years of
Solicitude: Intellectual Property Law, 1900-2000, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 2187, 2201
(2000) (noting that copyright scholars “argue that the rushed, industry backed
DMCA is very deeply flawed.”). See also Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual
Property and the Digital Economy: Why the Anti-Circumvention Regulations
Need to be Revised, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 519 (1999). In his book, Wired
Shut, Tarleton Gillespie noted that “in statutes like the DMCA, this logic is
used not just to tip the copyright scales toward corporate owners, but to
construct and stabilize particular arrangements of cultural distribution that
work hand in hand with these interests, and often against the public welfare.”
TARLETON GILLESPIE, WIRED SHUT 197 (MIT 2007).
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All of the software decisions, whether they favored or
disfavored the software producer, on the question of first sale
doctrine are best understood through the prism of the
underlying theory for copyright justification.
The prosoftware decisions are best rationalized by their adherence,
claimed or unclaimed, to the “property rights” theory.
Relying on the 1970’s economic theory of Harold Demsetz and
buttressed by a “natural rights” justification as articulated by
Professor Goldstein, “property rights” adherents have no
patience for other values in copyright other than maximum
control over the property by the owner and the sanctity of
markets as an instrument in the hands of the owner of such
property.
The courts and Congress have become strong “property
rights” adherents.290 The courts have attempted to distract
the focus of their rationales and outcomes from copyright
theory. Under the cover of flawed contract reasoning, the
courts argued that their decisions were “between parties” and
not “a right against the world.” The logic is fatally flawed. If
a copyright holder slaps a EULA (read: notice) on to the
packaging of a DVD, then puts such DVD into the stream of
global commerce, its rights are against the conceivably
millions of consumers who purchase that DVD around the
world. The trend began with ProCD and Bowers finding
privity where it didn’t exist, resulting in a subterfuge for the
real work that was going on. The transformation of copyright
law has occurred from one justified by “traditional
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incentives,” as articulated by the decisions of AIP I, SoftMan,
and (weakly) Vernor I, to one justified by “property rights,” as
articulated by AIP II, Harmony, ISC-Bunker, One Stop,
Stargate, and finally the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Vernor II.
The courts have shaped judicial doctrine to accommodate
software and in the process distorted the important principles
of Bobbs-Merrill. Bobbs-Merrill’s rationale and outcome
supported the “traditional incentives” approach to copyright,
namely that societal welfare is maximized by the proper
balance between protection of the copyrighted work and the
public’s access to copyrighted works. In Bobbs-Merrill, the
Supreme Court clearly argued against absolute control by the
copyright holder of the distribution of its copyrighted works.
The implication of the “property rights” evolution of the
judicial doctrine is clearly a severe restriction in the public’s
access to copyrighted works. The proposed “constructive
ownership” model attempts to recalibrate judicial doctrine to
be consistent with the important value to society of promoting
the balance between protection to the copyright holder and
the public’s access to copyrighted works.
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